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ABSTRACT 
After the recent financial crisis, the derivatives market has been hit with higher level 
of regulation standards to prevent and minimize the risks related to massive open 
derivative positions. Nevertheless, the corporate level risk management practices 
are widely using derivatives to hedge different market risks. Due to the counterparty 
default risk related to derivative products the financial markets have become more 
vulnerable to crises, which has also questioned the value of derivatives as risk 
management strategy. 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature by testing the relation between 
hedging and firm market value in firms listed in Nasdaq OMX Helsinki. Tobin’s Q 
is used as a proxy for firm market value in univariate and multivariate tests which 
divide hedgers in three categories: foreign exchange hedgers, interest rate hedgers 
and commodity price hedgers. In addition, a firm value effect of the relative size of 
firm’s derivative position is tested using hedging coverage as a control variable. 
The results through univariate and multivariate tests contrast with Allayannis and 
Weston (2001) findings as hedgers are identified with negative firm value effect. The 
effect is estimated to be -10,98 % for foreign currency hedgers and -5,27 % for interest 
rate hedgers, while general hedgers coefficient is negative but insignificant. Further 
research with larger international sample is required to confirm the findings and the 
effect of hedging coverage as the demographic of hedgers and non-hedgers in the 
Finnish sample is strongly driven by firm size.  
KEYWORDS: derivatives usage, firm value, risk management, hedging 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The nominal amount of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives in the global market 
increased substantially during the years 1998–2008. According to the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) statistics, during the long upward trend the peak was 
reached at $683.7 trillion in June 2008. At that point the financial crisis was already 
on its way, and the macro economic insecurity that followed caused the fluctuation 
in the derivatives overall value for the years 2008–2014. After a slight downturn, the 
nominal amount of OTC derivative contracts reached all-time high in June 2011 and 
again in December 2013 at $710.6 trillion. Since then the trend has been downward, 
resulting in the lowest value of past decade at $482.4 in December 2016. Part of this 
decline can be explained by exchange rate fluctuations, since depreciation of the 
euro against United States (U.S.) dollar causes the dollar amount of reported euro 
derivatives to diminish. However, the elimination of redundant contracts has been 
the main factor behind the fall. (BIS 2018.) Figure 1 describes the total nominal value 
of all OTC derivatives contracts from 1998 to 2017. 
Figure 1: OTC–derivatives market 1998–2017. (BIS 2018.) 
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The global derivatives market consists of two main parts: Exchange traded markets 
and OTC markets. The open outcry system, where traders meet physically to form 
the contracts was originally used in the exchange traded markets, but when 
technology advanced and computers became a part of everyday business, electronic 
trading largely substituted the open outcry system. The total amount of transactions 
is greater in the exchange traded markets, since automatic trading programs 
perform transactions faster than manually possible. OTC markets include trading 
between banks and large institutions; hence there is a much greater total value of 
derivatives contracts compared to exchange traded markets.  (Hull 2012; 2-4.) 
Because of the economic downturn of recent years, derivatives are used broadly as 
a tool to control firm’s financial risk. In fact, the market instability after the financial 
crisis in 2008 has driven firms more strongly towards using derivatives as risk 
management tool in the pursue of more predictable cash flows and better endurance 
for the years after the negative interest rates are no longer present. 
Overall during the last 40 years derivatives have become an important part of the 
financial markets worldwide, and consequently it has raised the supply of 
theoretical literature and empirical studies on derivatives to a whole new level. The 
derivative market growth can be partly explained by the rising interest in firms 
towards financial risk management, as derivatives are a useful tool, especially in 
cash flow management. Followed by the rapid expansion of the derivatives market 
in the 20th century, several studies have been conducted on derivatives, firm’s 
incentives to use them and the effects of derivatives on firm market value. 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) study was the first one to establish a direct link 
between derivatives and firm market value. Their results show a significant relation 
between the use of foreign currency derivatives in the firm and positive firm market 
value measured by Tobin’s Q. 
1.1. Purpose and hypothesis 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem, the market value of any firm is 
independent of its capital structure. The M&M theorem was introduced as the first 
proposition of their study “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory 
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of Investments” and it is one of the basic principles of corporate finance theory. This 
theorem suggests that controlling unpredictable cash flows by using derivatives has 
no effect on the firm market value, and that risk management is irrelevant for the 
firm as the shareholders can manage their risk by allocating their investment 
portfolio. (Allayannis & Weston 2001: 1.) 
In the past decades the theorem has been frequently challenged and several studies 
have examined whether a positive firm value effect exists in firms that use 
derivatives as a risk management tool. Allayannis and Weston (2001) study can be 
thought as a ground study for this relationship, their sample consists of 720 large 
non-financial U.S. firms and it focuses on foreign currency derivatives users. They 
are among the first ones to study the direct link between use of derivatives and firm 
market value by using Tobin’s Q as a proxy for the firm market value. Since then, 
there have been several studies on derivatives and firm value effect based on variety 
of different samples. Bartram, Brown and Conrad (2011) study the firm value effect 
with large international sample including firms from 47 countries, while Brunzell, 
Hanson and Liljeblom (2011) focus on Nordic firms by studying firm’s motivations 
behind derivatives usage. In addition, Pramborg (2004) and Alkebäck, Hagelin and 
Pramborg (2006) study derivatives usage in Swedish firms with data from the late 
90’s.  
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the effect of derivatives usage on firm market 
value among publicly listed Finnish companies during years 2010 – 2016. Due to 
increased regulation on derivatives and improved reporting standards the data of 
derivative usage in firms is widely available from the financial statements, which 
improves the credibility of the results presented in the study. As majority of 
derivatives users are now reporting the nominal position of the open derivative 
contracts, it is possible to test if the relative size of the derivatives position has any 
influence on the firm market value, which has not been included in most of the 
previous studies. Naito & Laux (2011) have however tested fair and nominal value 
of firms’ relative derivatives position as control variable in their study on non-
financial U.S. firms. They find indication of negative value premium for derivative 
users although their results were not significant and limited to the year 2009. By 
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introducing the control variable into larger sample consisting longer time period, it 
is possible to get more significant results for the position size effect. 
Apart from other thesis papers published in recent years, the Finnish firms are 
relatively untested group of derivative users when it comes to firm value effect. The 
size of the domestic market in Finland is substantially smaller compared to U.S., 
which means Finnish firms have more incentive to conduct business abroad to 
increase their revenue streams. This raises the need for foreign currency hedging in 
firms which can also be observed from the user data collected for this thesis. The 
hypotheses of this thesis are based on the prior empirical studies of derivatives and 
firm market value and on the assumption that data taken during negative interest 
rate environment might provide different results. The main hypothesis tests the 
positive firm value effect in firms that use derivatives in general by studying the 
levels of Tobin’s Q between users and non-users, and the secondary hypotheses test 
whether hedging with foreign exchange derivatives or commodity derivatives 
specifically is associated with higher firm market value. Third hypothesis is based 
on more recent assumption that the negative interest rate market environment is 
causing current interest rate hedges to be inefficient and expensive for the hedgers. 
Furthermore, the fourth hypothesis focuses on what kind of effect the relative size 
of open derivatives position has on firm market value, if such relation can be found. 
 
H1: Hedging with general derivatives has a positive effect on firm market value. 
H2: Hedging with foreign exchange or commodity derivatives has a positive effect 
on firm market value. 
H3: Hedging with interest rate derivatives is related with negative value premium 
during the negative interest rate environment.  
H4: The reported relative size of open derivative position has a positive effect on 
firm market value. 
13 
 
These hypotheses are tested first in mean and median univariate tests and finally in 
multivariate regressions with selected control variables. The univariate tests include 
testing the mean and median value differences in Tobin’s Q value between users 
and non-users, and between users of different type of derivatives. Multivariate tests 
are carried out with Tobin’s Q as dependent variable and proxy for firm market 
value, and size, leverage, profitability, liquidity, growth, dividend yield and ability 
to access financial markets as control variables which are proven to influence the 
firm market value in prior literature. In addition, a control variable for derivative 
position size is added to the group of control variables to see if the level of hedging 
has any impact on the market value. Furthermore, the multivariate tests are 
conducted using both pooled OLS regression and fixed effect regression methods. 
1.2. Motivation and structure of the thesis 
The motivation for this thesis originates from the personal interest towards 
derivatives instruments and their part in risk management strategies in non-
financial firms. We have witnessed several cases of sizeable financial losses during 
the financial crisis by a single firm in only short period of time caused by speculative 
use of derivatives and unhedged derivative positions. For instance, in 2006 a hedge 
fund Amaranth Advisors LLC lost 6.5 billion dollars in only one week’s time because 
of their aggressive speculative positions in natural gas derivatives. Amaranth 
Advisors expected the natural gas market price to fluctuate in the spring of 2007 and 
2008 and locked derivative positions which would result in profit in case the spread 
of the March and April contracts would increase. The opposite happened, and the 
hedge fund ended up in liquidation within a week as a consequence of losing over 
65 percent of its value in September 2006. (Hillier, Grinblatt & Titman 2012: 201.) 
After the crisis various stress tests have been executed for banks worldwide to see 
how vulnerable they are if another financial crisis emerges. Tests were carried out 
for Eurozone banks as well, and in Germany the Deutsche Bank’s financial stability 
has since been under review. Deutsche Bank failed one of the stress-tests in March 
2015 and lost over 30% of its market value during the 15 months that followed. 
Deutsche Bank’s derivative positions in 2013 were valued to be over 54 trillion euros, 
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which is over five times bigger than Eurozone GDP (Yahoo Finance 2016.) In case of 
Deutsche Bank would become unable to pay its derivatives obligations it would 
create a massive chain effect for the firms holding the opposite positions which could 
possibly result in even bigger financial crisis than the one Europe is now recovering 
from. 
This thesis contributes to the existing empirical literature by testing the firm value 
effect with the most recent data collected from relatively untested market 
environment in Finland. The results cover the “aftermath” of the financial crisis and 
will show how and if the Finnish firms have adjusted their open derivative positions. 
Furthermore, the results show if the use of interest rate, foreign exchange or 
commodity derivatives itself can be linked with positive market value effect, and as 
a fresh angle, whether the relative size of the open derivative position is a factor 
when the market value is considered. 
The thesis is structured as follows: In the second chapter the most common 
derivatives types are introduced and compared while the third chapter focuses on 
risk management theory and the effects of hedging on firm market value including 
review of prior academic studies in such field. The prior studies are summarized 
and categorized into three groups based on to which derivative type hedging their 
results contribute to: interest rate derivatives, foreign exchange derivatives or 
commodity price derivatives firm value effect. The fourth part includes the 
introduction of the data sample, followed by univariate and multivariate regression 
estimates and the related results. The final part consists summary of results and 
conclusions of this thesis and suggestions for further research ideas and angles on 
the topic of hedging and firm market value. 
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2. DERIVATIVES THEORY 
This section discloses the basic tools to understand the use of derivatives and their 
part in firm risk management strategies, including theoretical background of the 
general derivatives. 
2.1. Derivatives background 
According to one general definition, a derivative can be defined as a financial 
instrument, whose value depends on the value of the underlying asset or variable. 
The value of a derivative can also be derived from the value of basically any other 
variable. The asset from which a derivative’s value is derived from is called the 
underlying asset. This underlying asset of stock option for instance, is a stock of a 
certain firm. Besides financial assets, the underlying asset of derivative can be 
practically anything from a price of a salmon to an amount of rainfall in certain city. 
It has become increasingly important for everyone working in the financial sector to 
understand how derivatives work, and even for people working outside financial 
sector. After all, derivatives market is estimated to be considerably larger than the 
stock market when measured in terms of underlying assets. (Hillier et al. 2012: 202; 
Hull 2012: 1.) 
Derivatives can be used as simple tools for hedging, but when used as a way to make 
profit by speculating the market movements, the risks involved with the positions 
increase considerably and the firm becomes more vulnerable to losses. The most 
common derivatives introduced in this thesis are quite simply constructed and easy 
to understand, but to operate profitably with the more sophisticated derivative 
structures, deeper understanding is needed of the theory behind derivatives pricing 
and the current risk level of the underlying assets.  
Derivatives market has received a lot of attention and criticism after the recent 
financial crisis, where derivatives played a key role in the starting stages of the crisis. 
The first steps towards the crisis were taken in the United States when the standards 
of housing mortgages were relaxed in the beginning of 20th century, which invited 
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families that did not normally have access to a house loan, to join the housing 
market.  This resulted in rising house prices which forced the lenders to search for 
more ways to relax the standards, as the house prices became too expensive for 
families who were just then entering the market. (Hull 2012: 185-191.) 
In the process the lenders started to pay more and more attention to the possible 
profit that they could make from the mortgages rather than the financial solvency of 
the customers taking the loan. The possible profit to be made from a new loan 
became more important than the possible credit risk the customer would cause if the 
loan was granted. Out of these loans portfolios were constructed and turned into 
products called asset-backed securities or ABS. Basically ABS was used to transfer 
risk from a single portfolio and divide it into several investment branches with 
different interest rates, which would create profit for the investors if the underlining 
asset provided any cash flow. The investors were buying into a derivative product, 
but they had no way of knowing how risky assets it included and whether the ABS 
would provide any cash flow, since it was created out of risky house loans which 
were granted to families who would not be able to handle their loan expenses to 
begin with. (Hull 2012: 189–191.) 
These families were lured in to the housing market by attractive lower loan interest 
rates for the first few years of the loan, after which the interest rates would bump 
up. In 2007 several mortgage holders realized that they would not be able to afford 
the loan payments after these lower rates ended, which caused a wave of 
foreclosures in the housing market. Increasing amount of foreclosures increased the 
losses on mortgages, which lead to ABS products created out of these mortgages to 
report losses larger than 80 % of their value by the end of 2007 and become totally 
worthless by summer 2009. As a result, several major financial institutions suffered 
sizeable losses because of their big positions in ABS tranches; JP Morgan took over 
Bear Stearns and Bank of America took over Merrill Lynch and eventually Lehman 
Brothers was allowed to fail. Lehman Brothers had sizeable positions in over the 
counter derivative markets with close to 8000 different counterparties, which 
explains how the crisis spread so easily across the globe. The aftermath of the crisis 
was followed by several new laws and global regulations on banking industry, 
including stricter regulations in the OTC derivative market. (Hull 2012: 4, 189–195.) 
17 
 
These crisis scenarios involving derivatives and the fact that negligent or speculative 
use of derivatives can result in practically unlimited losses has resulted in harder 
regulation standards concerning derivatives trading. The dynamic of financial 
derivatives trading is that the deals are struck between at least two parties, and so 
the effects of a single defaulting counterparty can trigger a wave of defaults in firms 
holding the opposite positions.  
To control for the risks related to derivatives markets, the European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) regulation for derivatives started in August 2012. 
The new act was introduced as part of the post crisis regulations to ensure such 
scenario would not be repeated. The aim was to increase the availability of 
information on derivative contracts in general and to improve the risk management 
related to OTC-derivatives, a market which was previously rather unregulated. In 
addition to EMIR regulation, similar acts were issued globally as well.  EMIR act 
consists of three pain parts: the regulation on derivatives, standardized legislation 
concerning central clearing counterparties and improved regulation for trade 
repositories to which derivative positions are reported. Based on the EMIR 
regulation, all derivative users are to report their open contracts as of 16th of August 
2012, concerning all open trades or new trades made after that date. The EMIR act 
was approved by European Union commission in December 2012 and became valid 
later in March 2013. (Finanssivalvonta 2018.) 
Since then the regulation on derivatives has increased step by step including the 
global regulation standards MIFID and MIFIDII concerning close to everyone 
working on the financial sector from sales persons to clients. According to current 
standards the derivative users are obliged to clear certain derivative contracts with 
a third counterparty, called central clearing broker, to minimize the risk of 
counterparty default. In addition, changing of cash collateral to cover the risk related 
to open OTC-derivative positions became widely mandatory to all counterparties in 
financial sector during 2017, focusing especially on banks, insurance companies and 
other large financial institutions. The new act contributing to the existing EMIR 
regulation required collateral movements between counterparties on daily basis 
based on the changes in their bilateral derivative positions. The daily collateral 
movements are based on the variation margin, which is the daily change in the value 
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of all trades in the bilateral derivative position. Furthermore, as banks are required 
to move part of their derivative positions to central clearing brokers to minimize the 
counterparty default risk, daily collateral movements between the bank and the 
clearing broker are required to cover the variation margin changes in the cleared 
derivatives position. These changes in the regulation and especially the stricter 
requirements concerning derivatives reporting have made the firm level position 
data widely more available as firms are expected to disclose the risk related to their 
open derivative contracts in their annual fiscal reporting. Therefore, the data for 
open derivative positions for the sample firms is manually collected from the fiscal 
reports along with the information on firms’ derivative usage to form the control 
variable to test the fourth hypothesis. (Finanssivalvonta 2018.) 
2.2. The main derivative types 
The main derivative types in the market can be divided in to four groups: swaps, 
options, forwards and futures. Figure 2 shows the gross market values of main 
derivatives types in OTC derivatives market according to BIS statistics. Credit 
default swaps and Credit derivatives are included in the figure as their own group 
to demonstrate how the value of credit default swaps grew in the brink of the 
financial crisis in 2008 and has since then diminished considerably.  
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 Figure 2: OTC gross market values of main derivative types 2007–2017. (BIS 2018.) 
2.2.1. Swaps 
Swaps are contracts between two parties that include an agreement to exchange cash 
flows or to change cash for certain commodity. The contract defines specific dates 
when the exchange takes place and how the amount due for each party is 
determined. Swap maturity is determined by the last date of cash flow exchange, 
and the notional amount of swap defines the amount of the principal on which the 
interest is calculated. Swaps are generally used to control risk involved with 
unpredictable future cash flows. Swaps, like other derivatives can be customized 
from the general form, but the most commonly used swaps are interest rate swaps, 
currency swaps and credit default swaps. (Hillier et al. 2012: 206; Hull 2012: 152.)  
In 1993 the interest rate swaps covered barely 10 trillion dollars of OTC derivatives 
market value. Since then the interest rate swap market has grown considerably, 
resulting that in OTC markets interest rate swaps are presently the most commonly 
used derivatives type. According to BIS statistics, in 2015 interest rate swaps 
accounted for 319,9 trillion dollars of the OTC derivatives market, while the total 
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OTC derivatives market notional amount was 559,9 trillion dollars at the time. 
(Hillier et al. 2012: 207; BIS 2018.) Interest rate swap is an agreement where 
companies exchange regular payments of loan interests. A company with a floating 
interest rate loan can transform the floating interest into a fixed interest rate by 
entering to a swap contract, where the counter partner agrees to pay floating rate 
interest of agreed principal amount. In exchange for receiving floating rate 
payments, the company conducts fixed rate interest payments of the same agreed 
principal amount for the counterpart of the contract. The profit of interest rate swap 
contract is determined by calculating the net cash flow of the exchanged payments 
for each party. (Hull 2012: 155–156.) 
Currency swaps enable firms to issue bonds in any chosen currency and to exchange 
the returns into any currency required at the time. Moreover, multinational 
companies are now able to hedge the exchange rate risk associated with global 
transactions in different currencies, and to exploit the possibility to secure the lowest 
borrowing rates from the global capital markets. For instance, a currency swap can 
be used to transform U.S. dollar financial instrument into one denominated in euros, 
by exchanging principal and interest payments in these two currencies. The rapid 
growth in Eurobond market is also partially due to the fast-growing currency swap 
market.  (Hillier et al. 2012: 47, 207.)  
In fixed-for-fixed currency swap, principal amounts are first exchanged at the 
initiation of swap using the market exchange rate. For instance, in exchange for USD 
principal amount a company receives euro principal amount from the counterparty. 
The other party conducts annual or semi-annual euro interest payments at an agreed 
fixed rate and in return receives USD amount fixed rate interest payments from the 
counterparty. When the swap reaches maturity, the companies exchange the 
principal amounts once again, using the fixed exchange rate determined in the 
contract. (Hillier et al. 2012: 47, 207; Hull 2012: 168.) Furthermore, currency swaps 
can be executed using fixed rates, floating rates or one of each. For instance, a 
floating-for-floating currency swap can be understood as portfolio containing fixed-
for-fixed currency swap and one interest rate swap in each currency. (Hull 2012: 
175.) 
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Credit default swap is the most commonly used of the credit derivatives. The idea 
of credit default swap (CDS) is to provide insurance against risk of default by a 
certain firm. In CDS the firm in question is referred as reference entity and the event 
of default is called credit event. A CDS gives the buyer the right to sell their bonds 
issued by the reference entity in exchange of periodical payments to the seller of 
CDS. In case the reference entity does not default during the CDS contract time, the 
seller can keep the periodic payments as a profit. (Hull 2012: 572.) The gross market 
value of CDS:s in the OTC-market was highest during 2008 and 2009 which can be 
explained by the market uncertainty that followed after the financial crisis. When 
firms or investors have concerns about a certain firm’s survival they can enter a CDS 
contract which then covers some of the losses in case the reference entity defaults. 
(BIS 2018.) 
2.2.2. Options 
Options are generally divided in to two types: call options and put options. A call 
option gives the holder the right to purchase a certain underlying asset at an agreed 
date and for at agreed price, which are both stated in the option contract. A put option 
on the other hand gives the holder the right to sell a certain underlying asset at an 
agreed date and at an agreed price. The underlying asset of an option is usually a 
publicly traded stock valued at a certain price in the market, and the price for the 
asset is defined in the option contract and it can be referred to as exercise price or 
strike price. The date when the option contract ends, and the possible transaction 
happen is called expiration date or maturity. (Hull 2012: 8–9, 213.) 
American options can also be exercised at any given day before the option reaches 
maturity, whereas European options can only be exercised at the maturity. The name 
refers to the type of the option and has nothing to do with the geological location. 
Both options are traded in the exchanges and the OTC-markets, but most of the 
options traded in exchanges are American options. European options are used in the 
following examples in order to simplify the payoff calculations. The formulas are 
based on perfect capital markets assumption where transaction costs do not exist. 
The first model explains the payoff of a simple European call option. (Bingham & 
Kielsel 1998: 2–3; Hull 2012: 8–9, 213.) 
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(1)   S(T) – K, if S(T) > K and 0 otherwise, 
 
where 
 
S(T) = The price of the underlying asset at the maturity 
K = Strike price 
T = Maturity 
 
Option payout scenarios are called in-the-money, at-the-money and out-of-the-
money. If a call option reaches maturity when S(T) > K the option expires in-the-
money and the payout for the holder is S(T) – K. If S(T) = K the option expires at-the-
money and does not make profit for the holder, the holder usually does not use his 
right to exercise the option. Out-of-the-money payout happens if S(T) < K at the 
maturity, in this scenario the holder does not exercise the option and the amount of 
loss is defined by the amount of commission paid of the option. The commission is 
paid for the seller of the option and it is usually tied to the amount of the underlying 
asset in the contract. The opposite party or seller in option contract can also be called 
writer.  In contrast to forward and futures contracts, holder of the option can decide 
whether to exercise the option at the maturity. In futures and forwards which will 
be presented next the holder is obligated to complete the transaction at the maturity, 
but entering the contact is free of commission. (Hull 2012: 8–9, 214.) 
 
The players in the option markets can be divided into four groups: Buyers of calls, 
writers of calls, buyers of puts and writers of puts. The buyers are also referred to as 
long position holders, and the writers of options have so called short position. One 
position would not be available without the other, and thus it is crucial for options 
markets to have enough players willing to take short positions, as well as long 
positions. Options are used in firms for several purposes. The firms can use options 
as part of their risk management strategy to minimize investment losses for instance 
in the stock market in case of expected decline in the market. By securing a long put 
position a firm is able to sell the underlying asset at strike price, and possibly able 
to avoid larger losses in case the value of the underlying asset in the market would 
drop below the strike price. Long call positions on the contrary should be taken 
when the value of underlying asset is expected to rise, in which case the firm would 
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be able to buy the underlying asset at a previously agreed price and make a profit if 
the market price of the asset at maturity is higher than the strike price. (Hull 2012: 
10–12, 214–217.) 
2.2.3. Forwards 
Forward contract is an agreement between two parties where the other engages to 
buy a certain underlying asset at a certain time in the future for a certain price and 
the counterparty engages to sell the asset in question with the same terms. Buyer in 
forward contract is considered to have a long position whereas seller’s position is 
referred to as short position. Forwards are traded in the OTC market and most 
commonly the trade transpires between financial institutions and their clients. The 
ending date of forward contract is referred to as delivery date. Price for the asset in 
the forward contract is called delivery price and spot price is the price of the asset in 
the market at delivery date. Whereas options have commissions, entering to a 
forward contract is commission-free for both parties involved and the profit or loss 
of the contract is defined by the difference between spot price and delivery price. 
The following states a payoff from a simple long forward position. (Bingham & 
Kiesel 1998: 3; Hull 2012: 6–7.) 
 
(2)   S(T) – K, 
 
where 
 
S(T) = Spot price of the asset at the maturity of the contract 
K = Delivery price 
 
Once a forward contract is signed the transaction is obligatory for both parties at the 
maturity which makes the payoff structure of a forward simpler than payoff from 
an option contract. The payoff from short position in forward contract is the opposite 
of a payoff from a long position forward. 
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(3)   K – S(T), 
 
where 
 
K = Delivery price 
S(T) = Spot price of the asset at the maturity of the contract 
 
Companies can use forwards to control foreign currency risk which is also the most 
usual motivation behind a forward contract. Consider a situation where an 
American firm has a payment of 1 million due in euros in six months and the current 
exchange rate of Euro/USD is 1.2. One way to shelter the firm from the financial risk 
caused by the possible exchange rate fluctuations is to enter to a long position in 
forward contract, which allows the firm to buy 1 million euros with 1.2 million in 
USD at the day of the payment. If the euro strengthens against USD and the 
exchange rate rises to 1.3 during the six-month contract period, the firm has saved 
0.1 million with the forward contract. The risk associated with the forward contract 
is realized if the exchange rate declines before the delivery date, forcing the firm to 
buy the foreign currency with higher exchange rate than offered in the market. 
(Bingham & Kiesel 1998: 3; Hull 2012: 6–7.) 
 
The problems associated with forward trading come to exist due to the following 
reasons: Forwards are traded in the OTC market which means that there are no 
regulations concerning the contents of a forward contract. In addition, there are no 
guaranties for either side of the contract in case counterparty defaults and fails to 
make the agreed transaction at delivery date. This leads to the fact that even though 
the forward contract itself is commission-free for both parties involved, the 
negotiations and background analysis that are necessary in finding a creditworthy 
partner can require a lot of time and money and therefore the overall costs of finding 
a suitable forward contract can rise and devour the future profits of the contract. 
(Bingham & Kiesel 1998: 3.) 
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2.2.4. Futures 
Futures contracts are similar to the forward contracts discussed above, but the trading 
of futures commences in exchange traded markets and thus the contracts are 
standardized and insured by these exchanges. In a way futures contract can be 
thought of as a special type of forward contract that only trade in the exchange 
traded markets. The standardization of futures contracts eliminates the default risk 
from both sides and makes trading viable for parties that are not necessarily familiar 
with each other’s financial backgrounds. Futures are traded in exchanges around the 
world; the largest of which are Euronext.liffe, Eurex, TOCOM and CME group, 
formed in fusion of former Chicago Board of Trade and Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange. In these exchanges it is possible to trade futures based on large variety of 
financial commodities as well as agricultural commodities such as wheat. The 
financial commodities futures include currency futures, interest rate futures, bond 
futures, soft commodity futures and equity futures among others, like stock index 
futures. (Hillier et al. 2012: 204–206.) 
 
One of the defining differences between forward and futures contracts is the 
exchange of cash flows. In forward contracts cash flows are exchanged only at the 
maturity and so the possible shortage of sufficient cash in the firm is not unveiled 
until the end of the contract. However, in futures contract this problem is solved by 
automatic daily transactions between the contract parties. This method known as 
marking to market transfers cash flows from accounts where the counterparties 
were obligated to deposit the full value of the contract as a security payment in case 
of a default. These so-called margin accounts are established by the brokers and by 
following the daily transactions it is possible to spot the lack of sufficient funds 
before the end of the contract and therefore avoid the risk of total default. (Hillier et 
al. 2012: 204–206.) 
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3. RISK MANAGEMENT, HEDGING AND FIRM VALUE 
This chapter includes review on for what purposes firms are using derivatives and 
what are the most common risks they are hedging. In addition, prior studies and 
academic literature are analyzed to find out how derivatives can have a positive 
effect on firm value in theory and whether the results from prior studies support the 
hypotheses in this thesis. 
3.1. Derivatives and risk management 
According to the Modigliani-Miller theorem, in the absence of taxes and transaction 
costs hedging decisions on the corporate level do not affect the firm value. This is 
based on the statement that the capital structure of the firm does not affect firm 
value; ergo financial decisions do not make a difference to firm value. For decades 
the theorem has been acknowledged as one of the basic principles of corporate 
finance, but its assumptions have also been re-evaluated in various academic studies 
conducted during the recent years. (Hillier et al. 2012: 685–689.)  
There are three commonly recognized types of traders in the derivative markets; 
hedgers, speculators and arbitrageurs. Hedgers use derivatives to reduce risk they 
face from possible fluctuations of market price of a certain asset. Speculators on the 
other hand seek to make profit by predicting market movements and taking 
derivative positions based on their assessments of whether the price of an 
underlying asset is going to rise or fall. Without the speculators there can be no 
hedgers, since speculators are usually the ones taking the riskier position and thus 
enabling hedging positions. The third group of traders is arbitrageurs, who pursue 
riskless profit by entering into derivative positions in two or more markets and 
trying to make profit on the possible price difference of an underlying asset between 
the markets. All three types of traders are essential for functional derivative markets, 
as they ensure the high liquidity of the derivative contracts. Hedge funds for 
instance have become widely active in all three categories. However, this thesis 
concentrates only on hedging activities in firms while examining the market value 
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effect, as it is difficult to divide users to these categories if based only on the 
information provided by the firms in their fiscal reporting.  (Hull 2012: 11–17.) 
One of the assumptions behind the M&M theorem is that individual investors have 
the same opportunities to hedge financial risk as corporations, and thus hedging on 
the corporate level is not necessary. This might be accurate if the perfect capital 
markets assumption is met, but in reality, corporations have far better premises to 
start hedging than individual investors. Individual investors do not have access to 
the same information as the corporate executives have about the firm’s risk 
exposure; ergo the individual investors do not have the sufficient information to 
hedge the corporate risk efficiently. In the past the responsibility of hedging and 
managing the financial risk in the firm might have been assigned to a single 
executive, but nowadays many corporations have an entire department dedicated 
to hedging with derivatives. Acquiring the same amount of knowledge about 
derivatives and hedging is time consuming and costly for an individual investor or 
institution, which points to the fact that the corporations are in better position to 
make hedging decision. (Hillier et al. 2012: 685–689.) 
During the past decades hedging with financial derivatives has increased globally 
in corporations and it has become a standard part of their risk management 
strategies. This thesis concentrates on the derivatives side of risk management tools 
to examine the value creation hypothesis, with the acknowledgment that derivatives 
are not the only way to hedge interest rate, foreign currency or commodity price risk 
exposure. Weiss Center for international financial research in Wharton School 
organized large surveys in the years 1994–1997 for non-financial US firms about 
their derivatives usage, and the results of their most recent survey were analyzed by 
Bodnar, Hayt & Marston (1998). Their data consists of answers from 399 firms, out 
of which 200 reported using derivatives. The percentage of firms using derivatives 
(50 %) was higher than in previous surveys, 41 % in 1995 and 35 % in 1994, which 
implicates a mild increase in derivative usage among firms. However, part of the 
sample firms changed between the surveys and the reported percentage of 
derivative users among firms who provided answers to both 1994 and 1998 surveys 
was 44%. Out of the firms who reported derivative usage in the 1998 survey, 42% 
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answered that the usage has increased compared to the previous year, which means 
that the intensity of derivative usage had grown among these firms. 
In the more recent study Bartram, Brown & Fehle (2009) analyze international 
derivative users with a considerably larger sample, consisting total of 7319 firms 
from 50 countries, which accounts for almost 80% of global market capitalization of 
non-financial firms. They divide the users by the underlying asset in to three groups; 
Foreign exchange derivative, interest rate derivative and commodity price 
derivative users. Out of the total sample over half of the firms (60.3 %) reports using 
some type of derivatives, with foreign exchange derivative users (45.2 %) being the 
largest group. The smallest group being commodity derivative users (10 %) and 
interest rate derivative users (33.1 %) being the second largest.  
Brunzell et al. (2011) study the use of derivatives in Nordic firms by analyzing data 
from their survey, and although the sample size was noticeably smaller (112 
answers) than in the Bartram et al. (2009) study, the results on derivative users 
indicated towards the same direction. Close to 62 % of the firms answered positively 
to derivative usage question, and interestingly more than half of the users gave some 
weight to additional income as a motive behind derivative usage, although hedging 
was clearly the strongest motive. The general assumption is that derivatives are 
more commonly used as hedging tools, and since firms are not required to report 
the purpose behind their derivative contracts, it is difficult to determine the real 
incentives behind use of derivatives in firm level. Brunzell et al. (2011) find also 
weak support for positive value effect among derivative users, the value increase 
being caused by either reduced risk or by the profits made from derivative usage. 
3.2. Increasing firm value with derivatives 
There are several ways how the use of financial derivatives can influence the firm 
value, and while the positive firm value effect has been indicated in several studies, 
the results have not always been strong or significant. Bartram et al. (2011) find 
evidence that firms that use derivatives have lower cash flow volatility, lower 
standard deviation of returns and lower systematic risk. They also find that 
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derivative users have 15 %–31 % lower betas than matching firms which do not use 
derivatives. Further they were able to link derivative users with higher Tobin’s Q 
values, and higher market values, although the support for higher market value 
effect was weak and the Tobin’s Q results were not throughout significant. 
Managing cash flow volatility and therefore expected cash flows is fundamentally 
important for firms regardless of the industry or business model. Cash flow 
irregularities can raise the firm’s risk level and therefore decrease value since for 
instance, negative cash flows can force the firm to look for more expensive outside 
funding instead of self-financing the possible growth. Hedging can also reduce 
expected tax payments, as profits and losses are taxed differently. By hedging the 
firm can control the changes in expected cash flows and minimize irregular tax 
obligations. In addition, hedging increases expected cash flows by reducing the costs 
of financial distress. (Hillier et al. 2012: 685–691.)  
Figure 3: Effects of hedging on firm market value. (Bartram 2001.) 
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Reducing the corporate cash flow volatility leads to lower variance of firm value as 
well which is demonstrated in the Figure 3. When the firm’s cash flow volatility 
decreases, more cash is released to be distributed to the owners which in return 
increases the firm market value and moves the value curve from E1(V) to E2(V) as 
seen in Figure 3. (Bartram 2001.) 
3.2.1. Commodity price risk 
Commodity price risk that the firms are facing differs between industries, as in some 
industries the commodity price changes have a larger impact on the firm’s cash 
flows and profits, whereas in banking industry, for example, controlling the interest 
or currency rate fluctuations is usually more crucial for the company’s success. In 
theory, the biggest incentives to manage risks by using commodity derivatives are 
in companies that are selling or producing commodities that can be used as 
underlying assets, like oil or gas. The price volatility of a commodity is linked to the 
fact whether the commodity in question can be stored after harvesting, or whether 
the oversupply must be sold immediately. Examples of these situations would be 
wheat as a storable commodity and electricity as non-storable, as the oversupply of 
electricity must be sold to another market, and the amount of this oversupply will 
determine the market price for electricity. It means that electricity prices are quite 
volatile and therefore the price risks in that industry are relatively high, as the 
electricity demand is also directly linked to climate temperature in the region. Wheat 
grains on the other hand can be stored for years in case of excessive oversupply, and 
so the producers have a slightly better control of the market price even without 
derivatives. (Hull 2012: 775–778.) 
Current derivative markets offer wide range of commodity linked derivative 
products, and nowadays it is possible to find derivatives for almost any underlining 
asset ranging from agricultural commodities to weather related assets. However, 
according to BIS (2018) the amount of commodity linked derivatives in the OTC-
market is substantially smaller if compared to interest rate and foreign exchange 
derivatives, as seen in the second chapter in Figure 2. Commodity price fluctuations 
are not the main concern of risk for all firms and so the hedging for commodity price 
risk is more important in industries where the firm’s profits are directly linked to 
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price of some commodity, as in mining industry for instance. Nevertheless, 
Haushalter (2000) find that in the U.S. oil and gas industry the producers tend to 
hedge only less than 28 % of their production, while the majority of the production 
is left vulnerable to market price changes.  
Jin & Jorion (2007) study the derivative firm value effect in North American gold 
mining industry with a sample from years 1991–2000 including 44 firms. They find 
evidence that hedging decreases the firm’s stock exposures to gold price changes, 
but further analysis did not show support for the positive firm value effect when 
using Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value. Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2006) find 
hedging premium in U.S. airline industry for jet fuel price hedgers. They state the 
result is due to the high volatility of the jet fuel price and that firms are willing to 
hedge the price risk since the price of jet fuel accounts for sizable percentage of the 
operational costs in airline companies.  Consequently Tufano (1996) examined gold 
mining industry as well and finds that managers make hedging decision quite 
strongly based on their own incentives. He finds that the length of CFOs tenure 
impacts hedging decisions and that managers who hold copious amounts of firm’s 
equity have a higher tendency to hedge the gold price risk in the firm. (Hillier et al. 
2012: 709.) 
3.2.2. Foreign exchange risk 
Foreign exchange risk or currency risk affects companies that are engaged in 
business transactions in some foreign currency in addition to transactions in 
domestic currency. Especially multinational corporations are exposed to currency 
risks, as changes in currency rates affect firm’s cash flows and accounting profits. 
Currency rate changes can also influence firm’s market and book values as 
demonstrated in the following risk categories. Foreign exchange risks can be 
generally divided into three categories: transaction risk, translation risk and 
economic risk. Next, we concentrate on how firms can hedge risks in these categories 
and whether positive value effect of foreign exchange derivatives can be found in 
prior academic studies. 
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Transaction risk is the immediate effect that exchange rate changes have on firm’s 
cash flows. Buying or selling a good priced in foreign currency exposes the firm to 
transaction risk, since the changes in the currency rate between the trade date and 
date of settlement will influence the cash received or paid in domestic currency. 
However, it is relatively easy for firms to hedge these cash flow uncertainties by 
altering the agreement or by using currency derivatives. In case the counterparties 
agree that payment of the sale will be carried out in the domestic currency, no 
hedging is needed for the currency risk. Alternatively, one or both of the 
counterparties can enter into a forward contract which allows the firm to lock the 
exchange rate to certain level to minimize the foreign currency risk. Constructing 
hedges for this kind of individual transactions is quite straightforward but 
managing the economic risk of foreign currency changes requires risk management 
beyond transaction risk. (Hillier et al. 2012: 702–704.) 
Translation risk is the risk associated with foreign subsidiary’s book value 
depreciation in the parent company’s balance sheet. While decrease in the book 
value of the subsidiary might not result in straight losses, additional costs to the firm 
can occur through loan covenant contracts. A certain minimum level of book value 
is often included in loan contracts and if the firm’s book value drops below such 
level, a loan covenant violation has occurred. These violations can lead to penalty 
fees, and so it might be relevant for firms to consider hedging the translation risk. 
(Hillier et al. 2012: 702–704.) 
Hedging economic risk is far more complex than hedging risks from the two 
categories introduced above. Where transaction risks and translation risks include 
short-term risks associated with individual transactions and risks from translation 
of financial statements, the economic risk category comprises more long-term risks 
that must be considered to have a continuous effect on the firm’s financials.  
Economic risks can be defined as risks linked with losing competitive advantage 
because of exchange rate fluctuations. To understand the risk management of 
economic risks in theory, we first need to consider the factors that define what kind 
of effect exchange rate changes have on a firm’s business. According to Hillier et al. 
(2012) these factors include; differences between the location of production 
operation and where the product is sold, the location of competitors and finally 
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whether the input prices are determined in international or local markets. Through 
foreign competitors’ economic risks can influence firm’s success even if the firm is 
only selling their product in the local market. Transaction and translation risks are 
commonly hedged in multinational firms at least to some extent, but hedging long-
term economic risk is nonexistent in these firms. To hedge the long-term economic 
risk effectively, a firm would have to estimate both the current and the long-term 
effects on firm’s cash flows caused by exchange rate fluctuations. (Hillier et al. 2012: 
702–705.) 
The exchange rate changes in the market can be caused by real changes in exchange 
rates or by inflation rate differences between two countries. If the price of a product 
rises in Finland due to 5 % inflation while the inflation in the U.S. is 0 %, the euro 
would likely weaken 5 % against the U.S. dollar and the product can still be bought 
in the U.S. for the same number of euros as before; this is called the nominal 
exchange rate change. In this situation the real exchange rate which measures the 
relative price of U.S and Eurozone products stays the same. The problem in hedging 
the long-term economic risk of currency changes arises from the fact that it is 
challenging to determine when the currency rates changes are due to nominal or real 
rate changes. If the changes in exchange rates are nominal, then forward and futures 
contracts provide only imperfect hedges, leaving the firm subject to exchange rate 
risks. (Hillier et al. 2012: 702–705.) 
The study of Allayannis and Weston (2001) on foreign exchange derivatives and firm 
value provides strong results to support positive value effect on firms which are 
exposed to foreign exchange risk and are hedging with foreign exchange 
derivatives. They use Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value and find significant results 
that derivative users have 4,87 % higher firm value than the nonusers. In addition, 
a small positive firm value effect was found with firms that have no direct foreign 
exchange risk but may be exposed to such risk through export or import operations. 
However, the results were statistically insignificant. Allayannis and Weston (2001) 
also conduct an event study to analyze whether the decision to change hedging 
policy has any effect on firm market value and find evidence that firms which decide 
to start hedging experience a value increase compared to the firms that remain 
unhedged. Moreover, the evidence shows that firms which decide to stop hedging 
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experience a decrease in market value when compared to firms that continue with 
their hedging policy. Overall the results of Allayannis and Weston (2001) show 
support on positive firm value effect with firms that are using foreign exchange 
derivatives to hedge their risk associated with foreign currency transactions.  
Besides Allayannis and Weston (2001), Belghitar, Clark and Judge (2008) find foreign 
currency derivative hedging to have a statistically significant Tobin’s Q value 
premium of 14.7 % and for hedging to be more value creating when including all 
foreign currency hedging methods. The foreign currency hedgers in their UK sample 
include firms which hedge also interest rate risk, which may partially drive their 
results. Also, Clark and Judge (2009) find 23.7 % significant hedging premium for 
foreign currency derivative hedgers, especially driven by the use of currency swaps.  
3.2.3. Interest rate risk 
According to BIS (2018) statistics, interest rate derivatives account for most of the 
OTC-derivatives market. When the market rates turned negative in 2015, interest 
rate contracts covered over 70% of the OTC-derivatives market measured in gross 
market values, in comparison foreign exchange and commodity derivatives together 
accounted for only 18% of the market. Therefore, it is expected these interest rate 
derivative contracts are currently expensive for the hedging parties, whereas market 
makers have profited of the difference in market rates and offered fixed rates. This 
assumption is tested by the third hypothesis in the univariate and multivariate part. 
Interest rate risks concern both lender and debtor firms, as lender’s income from a 
loan and the debtor’s loan payments are both always linked to some applicable 
interest rate. Furthermore, interest rates are used in pricing of several financial 
products, including derivative instruments, where the risk-free rate is usually a 
government treasury rate or London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) which is 
commonly used as borrowing rate between banks. (Hull 2012: 77–78.) 
Derivative instruments offer tools for corporate managers to control interest rate 
risk, and according to BIS (2015) interest rate swap is the most used form of 
derivatives in the OTC derivative market, as introduced earlier in the second 
chapter. Hakkarainen, Kasanen and Puttonen (1997) examined interest rate 
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management in large Finnish firms and find that hedging decisions are influenced 
by market view, but interest rate policies seem to be risk aversive. However, they 
found no evidence of leverage affecting the interest rate hedging decisions, instead 
firm size appears to be one influencing factor. 
Choice of capital structure defines how widely the firm is exposed to interest rate 
risk, since increasing debt financing will increase interest costs as well. The 
motivation to hedge interest rate risk comes usually from controlling these interest 
costs, and there are some studies supporting the assumptions that firms with high 
leverage ratios tend to hedge more than low leveraged firms. Block and Gallagher 
(1986), Wall and Pringle (1989) and Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) find weak 
evidence supporting the higher use of derivatives among firms with higher leverage 
ratio. The decision of how to balance the firm’s capital structure is the first step in 
interest rate risk management, following the decisions whether to take debt in 
foreign or domestic currency and if the debt has fixed rate or floating rate interest 
payments. These actions affect the firm’s liability stream, which is the stream of 
interest payments generated from the liabilities. Furthermore, the liability stream 
can be controlled after these choices are made, by using derivatives to balance the 
expected liability stream. In addition, Hakkarainen et al. (1997) find that besides risk 
aversion, firms are also motivated to use derivatives to maximize their interest 
income. (Hillier et al. 2012: 700–703, 785.)  
There are different options of liability streams, which a firm can create by using 
short-term or long-term debt and by deciding whether to hedge the interest rate risk. 
To clarify the differences in these liability streams the examples show only two kinds 
of maturity, short-term debt as due in one year and long-term as due in five years. 
The first equation shows liability stream of short term debt where t indicates that 
short-term rates and firm’s credit rating change during maturity: 
(4)   ist = rst + dst, 
where 
ist = The firm’s short term borrowing cost for period t 
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rst = The risk-free short-term rate for period t 
dst = The default spread for period t 
 
 
The next liability stream involves floating-rate loan, which firms can acquire straight 
from financing institutions or by using interest rate swaps like demonstrated in 
chapter 2.3. The equation of the stream is as follows: 
(5)   ift = rst + d1, 
where 
ift = Firm’s period t interest rate on the long-term floating-rate loan. 
rst = The risk-free short-term rate for period t 
d1 = The default premium 
 
 
The stream described above leaves the firm exposed to interest rate risk but not to 
credit rating risk. The fourth possibility is the hedged liability stream where the 
changes in interest rate are hedged but the firm is exposed to credit rating risk. 
(6)   iht = r1 + dst, 
where 
iht = hedge borrowing cost for period t 
r1 = the long-term interest rate 
dst = default spread for period t  
 
The equation (7) demonstrates how interest rate derivative instruments enable firms 
to create alternative liability streams which are not possible without derivative 
instruments. The liability stream structure in the equation can be divided in to two 
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parts; the risk-free interest rate part and the credit rating part. Prior to the 
introduction of interest rate swaps and futures, firms had basically two possible 
outcomes of liability streams when deciding whether to borrow long term or short 
term. Borrowing short term left the firm exposed to both credit risk and interest rate 
risk, while borrowing long term with fixed rate the firm could avoid both risks.  With 
derivative products firms can separate the risks, so that changes in credit rating no 
longer cause interest rate risk. By hedging the interest rate risk with interest rate 
swap for instance, a firm can separate interest rate risk exposure and credit rating 
risk and is only exposed to the credit rating risk. (Hillier et al. 2012: 700–703.) 
Belghitar et al. (2008) in their study on UK sample find that interest rate derivative 
hedging creates substantially more firm value from debt capacity than foreign 
currency hedging. Their Tobin’s Q analysis also generates larger coefficients for 
interest rate derivative hedgers than other hedgers of interest rate risk. Furthermore 
Hakkarainen et al. (1997) results show that interest rate swap was the most used 
derivative instrument in interest rate risk management in Finnish firms, alongside 
with forward rate contracts and OTC options. Hakkarainen et al. (1997) and Bodnar, 
Hayt, Marston and Smithson (1995) find also firm size to be positively related to the 
use of derivatives. 
However, due to the unusual market environment of negative interest rates the old 
strategies of interest rate hedging and the value effect of hedging interest risk 
exposure should be re-evaluated. As the market rates declined below zero in April 
of 2015, most of the interest rate hedges constructed during past years are currently 
strongly out of the money for the firms buying the hedges. As firms use interest rate 
derivatives to shield their loan portfolios from interest risk exposure and high 
interest costs, it is possible that if the period of negative interest rates continues the 
active interest rate derivative positions start to affect negatively to firm values 
through increased cost of hedging. This effect is further tested with the third 
hypothesis. 
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3.3. Previous literature on derivatives and firm value 
Table 1 summarizes the body of previous studies on derivatives and firm market 
value and shows the derivative type tested in each study. GEN stands for general 
hedgers, IRD for interest rate hedgers, FCD for foreign currency hedgers and COM 
for commodity price hedgers respectively. As discussed earlier the results are 
mainly supporting the positive value premium in Allayannis & Weston (2001), but 
few studies like Nguyen & Faff (2007) and Naito & Laux (2011) suggest that there 
might be negative value premium instead for derivative hedgers.  
Most of the studies in Table 1 are conducted with sample period before the financial 
crisis and the negative market rate environment, with the exception of Naito & Laux 
(2011) and their data from 2009. In addition, Tobin’s Q is used widely as dependent 
variable and proxy for firm value in these studies which makes the results quite 
comparable between different samples. This thesis provides the latest information 
on how the use of derivatives has changed among Finnish firms during years after 
the financial crisis. Following that the sample period in this thesis is close to decade 
later when compared to the studies in Table 1, it is possible that the results are not 
in line with the base studies in this field. The empirical part will further reveal what 
kind of firm value effect can be observed for hedgers in Nasdaq OMX Helsinki. 
Table 1: Summary of previous literature on hedging and firm value effect. 
Study Sample Time 
period 
Derivative 
type 
Value 
premium 
Graham & Rogers (1999) 531 U.S firms 1995 FCD & IRD +2.2-3.5 % 
Allayannis & Weston (2001) 720 large U.S. firms 1990-1995 FCD +4.9 % 
Pramborg (2004) 455 Swedish firms 1997-2001 GEN Positive 
Carter, Rogers & Simkins (2006) 28 U.S. airline firms 1992-2003 COM 5.5-10 % 
Jin & Jorion (2006) 119 U.S. oil and gas firms 1998-2001 COM No support 
Jin & Jorion (2007) 44 U.S. gold mining firms 1991-2000 COM Negative 
Nguyen & Faff (2007) 428 Australian firms 1999-2000 GEN Negative 
Belghitar, Clark & Judge (2008) 412 UK firms 1995 IRD/FCD +8.5-18.6 % 
Khediri & Folus (2010) 320 French firms 2001 GEN Negative 
Bartram, Brown & Conrad (2011) 6888 International firms 1998-2003 GEN Positive 
Brunzell, Hansson & Liljeblom (2011) 112 Nordic firms 2006 GEN +1.8-2.1 % 
Naito & Laux (2011) 434 U.S. firms 2009 GEN -12.8 % 
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4. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
The empirical part of the thesis introduces the data sample, dependent variable and 
independent variables used in the regressions. Furthermore, the methodology of 
univariate and multivariate regressions is revealed, and results of primary 
regressions and robustness checks are examined. 
4.1.  Data  
The data is collected of firms listed in OMX Helsinki stock exchange between years 
2010 and 2016. The Finnish sample is chosen since it is rather unstudied sample in 
the line of hedging and firm value studies, and the relatively small number of listed 
firms in OMX Helsinki allows us to include all the firms in the sample and thus 
avoid any doubts of data mining. Prior studies like Allayannis and Weston (2001) 
with U.S. sample and Bartram et al. (2009) with international sample have studied 
firms in considerably larger markets and therefore the results from the Finnish 
market do not necessarily follow the same line. The demographic of Finnish sample 
differs from U.S. sample used by Allayannis and Weston (2001) in several ways, the 
first being the size of the domestic market. As Finland is part of the eurozone and 
the growth opportunities in firms with only domestic sales are limited, the Finnish 
firms are more prone to look for additional revenue abroad and thus facing the need 
to hedge their foreign exchange exposure. Due to large domestic market the U.S. 
firms have more homeland growth opportunities without the necessity to enter the 
international markets. Evidence of this can be found comparing the derivative user 
statistics from this study to previous findings in academic studies conducted on U.S. 
sample. 
The sample period from 2010 to 2016 catches the years of recovery after the financial 
crisis in 2008-2009, as well as the period of slow and steady growth supported by 
macroeconomic easing in the eurozone. The unusual market environment of first 
low and then negative interest rates that has lasted for several years already have 
also driven the firms to re-evaluate their interest rate risk hedging policies. By 
analyzing the derivative user data of the Finnish sample, we can observe if any 
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relation between the low interest environment and level of derivative usage can be 
found. 
4.1.1. Sample description   
The number of observations varies slightly through the sample period, as de-listed 
firms are deleted from the sample and newly listed are added. For the purposes of 
comparability and the availability of data only firms that were listed at the end-of-
year each year are included in the sample. Due to cross-sectional characteristics of 
the data, firms do not need to be listed at the end of every observation year to be 
included in the sample, as the sample for each year will be formed independently. 
Therefore, the data set is identified to have pooled cross-section characteristics, as 
well as panel data features as yearly observations are collected repeatedly for the 
same firms, apart from the ones dropped from the sample because of de-listing. 
(Woolridge 2011: 5–7.) 
Databases Orbis and Datastream are used as sources for the financial firm data. The 
derivative user data along with derivative position data is manually collected from 
the financial statements of the sample firms. International Accounting Standards 
(IAS) declare that the firms are to report their open derivative positions which has 
made the derivative user data widely available. Following the IAS demands firms 
have started to report their derivative positions even if they do not use IAS 
standards in their fiscal reporting. Each year firms are classified as derivative users 
and non-users based on whether information on hedging activities and open 
positions is found on the financial statement. Additionally, the derivative users are 
divided into three sub categories by the derivatives types: commodity price 
derivatives, foreign exchange derivatives and interest rate derivatives. If a firm has 
an open position in at least one of the derivative sub categories, it is added to the 
correct sub category and to general derivative users group. As a large part of the 
sample firms have open positions in more than one of the derivatives types, the firms 
in sub categories are partially overlapping. 
The financial statements of the sample companies were also examined to fill the gaps 
in the Orbis and Datastream datasets. Financial firms are often market makers in 
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derivative markets and their motive for derivative usage differs from the non-
financial firms, thus all financial firms are excluded from the sample. Firms with 
insufficient information of their derivative usage, or missing data for Tobin’s Q or 
any of the main regression variables, excluding the derivative position variable, are 
deleted from the sample. After removing financial firms and all firms with missing 
data for any of the main regression variables, the main sample consists in total of 
748 firm year observations ranging from 98 observations in 2010 to 123 observations 
in 2016. The total of 748 observations include also firms that did not report the size 
of their derivatives position but declared if they had open derivates contracts at the 
end of the fiscal year. For the multivariate regressions where the derivatives position 
size is added as independent variable those firms are deleted leaving 737 firm year 
observations for the multivariate regression sample. 
Table 2 shows how the use of derivatives has changed during the sample period 
from 2010 to 2016. The firms are divided yearly into three sub categories based on 
the reported open positions at the end-of-year financial statements: foreign currency 
derivative users (FCD), interest rate derivative users (IRD) and commodity price 
derivative users (COM). GEN denotes general derivative users and includes all the 
firms which have open position in any of the three sub categories. Table 2 statistics 
show that IRD is the largest derivative user sub category each year with a peak of 66 
of out 100 firms in 2012 reported using interest rate derivatives. As can be seen from 
the table, the combined user amount in the three sub categories is greater than the 
general derivative user category each year which indicates that most of the sample 
firms have open position in more than one of the sub categories. In fact, through the 
sample period on average 85% of the firms with foreign currency derivatives have 
an open position in also interest rate or commodity price derivatives, while 73% of 
firms with interest rate derivatives and 94% of firms with commodity price 
derivatives have an open position in at least one other sub category. 
The percentage level of derivative users has decreased from 84 % in 2010 to 66 % in 
2016 which would indicate that the use of derivatives has decreased among OMX 
Helsinki companies. However, the actual number of derivative users has stayed 
relatively stable through the years with minimal variance and therefore the decrease 
in the user percentage level can be partly explained by the growth in the number of 
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listed companies and by the absence of derivative positions among the most recently 
listed firms in OMX Helsinki. Inside the sub categories the derivative user levels 
have also slightly declined, with number of FCD users dropping from 64 in 2013 to 
58 in 2016, IRD users from 68 to 65 and COM users from 33 in 2014 to 29 in 2016. 
During the same period number of firm year observations increased from 104 in 
Table 2: Derivative user statistics by year and derivative type. 
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2013 to 123 in 2016, indicating that the new additions to the sample are mostly non-
users. Even though there is no significant drop to be observer among interest rate 
hedgers, the negative interest rate environment can be one of the reasons why 
adding the newly listed companies to the sample has not increased the derivative 
user level in that sub category. 
However, as we compare the user statistic in Table 2 to previously published studies 
the user levels in the Finnish sample of this thesis are found to be considerably 
higher. Bartram et al. (2009) study derivative users’ motives with a large 
international sample of 7,319 firms in 2000 – 2001. They find 60,3 % of the total 
sample firms to be derivative users, with user levels in sub categories of 45,2 % 
foreign exchange derivatives, 33,1 % interest rate derivatives and 10 % in commodity 
price derivatives. Bartram et al. (2009) find user level among Japanese firms to be 
81.3 % which is closest to the levels in this thesis, but for OECD firms they find 64.3 
% user level.  Brunzell et al. (2011) study derivative users in 2006 with Nordic sample 
and find 61.6 % derivative user level with their survey sample including 112 firm 
responses which is close to the yearly sample size in this thesis. If the higher 
derivative user levels are not only limited to Finnish sample in this thesis, these 
results indicate that if a larger study with international sample would be conducted 
with more recent data, we could also see increase in derivative user levels outside 
Finnish sample during the past decade. In addition, Dahlberg (2012) studies 
derivative users in her thesis with Finnish sample and finds level of general 
derivative users increasing from 63 % in 2005 to 76 % in 2010 which supports the 
user level findings of this thesis. Furthermore Bartram et al. (2009) supported by 
Brunzell et al. (2011) find that use of commodity price derivatives is more common 
among firms in traditional industries like oil, metal, mining and utilities, which can 
explain the demographic of commodity price derivative users in the Finnish sample.  
4.1.2. The dependent variable 
The dependent variable for the univariate and multivariate regressions is chosen 
based on evidence from prior studies and on the availability of data for the sample 
firms.  In prior literature Tobin’s Q has been widely used as a proxy for firm market 
value in the field of derivatives and firm market value studies, in addition the data 
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for calculating Tobin’s Q is easily available from the databanks as it is calculated 
from the balance sheet figures. Therefore, Tobin’s Q is chosen as dependent variable.  
 (7)  Tobin’s Q =  
Market value of assets is calculated as book value of total assets subtracted by book 
value of equity plus market value of equity while book value of assets represents the 
replacement cost of all assets. Market value of equity is calculated by using total 
number of preferred shares at the end-of-year reporting and year-end market price 
for that share. Tobin’s Q values are calculated independently for each firm at end-
of-year through the sample period and thus firms with missing information for 
share market price are identified as de-listed firms and are deleted from the sample. 
The median of Tobin’s Q 1.23 is below the mean value 1.55 (Table 3) which indicates 
that the distribution is skewed and in line with Allayannis & Weston (2001) findings. 
To control for the skewness, we use natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q instead of the 
standard version and therefore we can show the results as percentage changes in 
firm market value as in Allayannis & Weston (2001).   
The function of Tobin’s Q is that it measures the market value of firms’ assets to the 
replacement cost of these assets. There are several versions introduced in prior 
literature of how to define these components in Tobin’s Q as for instance using 
simplified measure of market value of firm to book value of total sales or more 
sophisticated model like Allayannis & Weston (2001) in line with Lewellen and 
Badrinath (1997) method on how to calculate the replacement cost of all assets. 
However, as the more advanced methods set higher requirements for the data 
availability, Allayannis & Weston (2001) along with Nguyen & Faff (2007) 
demonstrate that the results are only slightly affected by the chosen Tobin’s Q 
method as Allayannis & Weston (2001) find 0.93 correlation in results by testing 
advanced and simplified Tobin’s Q methods.  Therefore, choosing a simplified 
method for measuring Tobin’s Q is justified. 
Market value of assets 
Replacement cost of all assets 
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4.1.3. Dummy variables 
Independent variables in the regressions include dummy variables for derivatives 
users and control variables for the known factors affecting firm market value. 
Derivative users are identified from the sample by applying dummy variables. First 
dummy variable for general derivative users (GEN) is used to define if a firm 
belongs to the derivative users group or not. If a firm states that they used 
derivatives or reported open position in any of the derivative types during that year, 
the dummy gets a value of one, otherwise zero. In addition, general derivative users 
are classified to sub categories by introducing three more dummy variables based 
on what type of derivatives the firm is using: foreign currency derivatives (FCD 
dummy), interest rate derivatives (IRD dummy) or commodity price derivatives 
(COM dummy). If a firm is using foreign exchange derivatives, the FCD dummy 
gets a value of one, zero otherwise. If a firm is using interest rate derivatives the IRD 
dummy gets a value of one, zero otherwise. And finally, if a firm is using commodity 
price derivatives, the COM dummy gets a value of one, zero otherwise. 
Using the four dummy variables above the sample firms are divided to derivative 
users by main types and to non-users. The data for the dummy variables is collected 
manually from end-of-year financial statements of the sample firms. If a firm clearly 
states to have open derivative contracts at the end of fiscal year, the dummy gets a 
value of one and, zero otherwise. If a firm did not mention the use of derivatives in 
the financial statement of that year, but information regarding backdated start of 
derivatives usage is found from the financial statements of the following years, the 
firm is classified as user according to when the use of derivatives started. If a firm 
reports that their risk management policies include derivatives, but does not 
currently have an open position, the dummy GEN gets a value of zero and the firm 
is classified as nonuser. If a firm does not provide any information concerning use 
of derivatives, it is deleted from the sample. 
4.1.4. Control variables 
Control variables are chosen based on the previous literature in the field of firm 
value studies and further a new modified control variable is introduced related to 
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derivatives position size. Based on the previously known factors in the firm market 
value, we will control for firm size, leverage, growth, profitability, liquidity and 
ability to access financial markets. In addition, control variables for hedging 
coverage and time effects during negative interest rate period are tested, which has 
not been included in the previous literature as such. 
Size is included as control variable in most of the relevant studies on firm market 
value, but the evidence on its effect to Tobin’s Q has not always been strong. Bartram 
et al. (2011) and Brunzell et al. (2009) find that large firms are more prone to use 
derivatives and Allayannis & Weston (2001) along with Belghitar et al. (2008) find 
that size has negative impact on Tobin’s Q. These results support the assumption 
that small firms have more value than large firms and that derivative users are large 
firms and therefore it is expected for size to have positive correlation with derivative 
usage but negative with firm value. These results are regardless that Tobin’s Q 
measure is comparable between different firm sizes which indicates that firm size 
might affect firm value in number of ways. Here size is measured as natural 
logarithm of firms’ total assets in line with Allayannis & Weston (2001). 
Leverage is included because the capital structure of a firm can affect the firm value 
and highly leveraged firms are more exposed to interest rate risk and therefore 
might find a need to hedge their exposure. Jin & Jorion (2006) found a positive 
relation between leverage and Tobin’s Q as opposed to Allayannis & Weston (2001) 
who find a negative relation. The common assumption being that firms that have 
low debt levels are more valuable than firms which have had to use debt as main 
financing method, as high leverage ratio can imply a higher firm risk. (Bartram et al. 
(2011.) Along with Allayannis & Weston (2001) leverage is here measured as long-
term debt to shareholders’ equity. 
Growth opportunities can result in positive firm value as investments made on 
tangible assets are associated with future profits in case the investment pays off and 
thus lead to higher firm value in the future. Capital expenditures show the size of 
investments on assets that a firm has made for the future and when compared to 
firm’s total revenue we can see what portion of sales a firm is ready to invest on the 
future growth. Following Allayannis & Weston (2001) and Jin & Jorion (2006) 
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growth is calculated by capital expenditures divided by total sales, they also find a 
positive relation between growth opportunities and Tobin’s Q which leads us to 
expect a positive relation as well. 
Profitability as measured by net income to total assets, or more commonly known as 
return on assets (ROA) is controlled since profitable firms are associated with higher 
firm value. ROA demonstrates how efficiently a firm is generating income from its 
assets and is widely used as a measure for firm value. Allayannis and Weston (2001) 
state that profitable firms are expected to trade with premium and therefore have a 
higher Tobin’s Q compared to not profitable firms. Along with Allayannis & Weston 
(2001), Bartram et al. (2009) and Jin & Jorion (2006) a positive relation between 
profitability measure and Tobin’s Q is expected. 
Liquidity is controlled since the availability of cash can affect firm value through 
increased risk or higher operating costs. On the other hand, firms with lower excess 
cash are more prone to invest only on lower risk projects with positive net present 
value and thus resulting in higher Tobin’s Q in the future as opposed to firms with 
high liquidity. (Pramborg 2004.) Also, Bartram (2000) finds that firms with low 
liquidity are more likely to hedge than high liquidity firms. In line with Pramborg 
(2004) and Bartram (2000) current ratio is used as a proxy for liquidity. 
Access to financial markets is expected to have negative relation to Tobin’s Q since 
according to Allayannis & Weston (2001) and Jin & Jorion (2007) firms with cash 
flow problems are more likely to pass on negative net present value projects and 
therefore have higher Q’s. On contrary Jin & Jorion (2007) see that decision to pay 
dividends is a positive indicator from the management and therefore relation can be 
also positive. Access to financial markets can be measured with dividend payment 
decision or alternatively with dividend per share value. Here dividend dummy is 
chosen to proxy access to financial markets, the dummy gets a value of one if a firm 
has paid dividend during that year and zero otherwise in line with Allayannis & 
Weston (2001) and Jin & Jorion (2007). 
Negative rates is the dummy variable used to separate the observations during time 
period of negative interest rates in years 2015 and 2016 from the whole period and 
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to test the third hypothesis. The possible effect of negative interest rate market 
environment to value effect of hedging is a new addition to control variables which 
has not been included in previous literature as the market rates in Europe have never 
been noted below zero before the April of 2015. Table 2 also shows that the level of 
derivative users has steadily declined going into 2015 and therefore it is interesting 
to see if any hedging premium can be found during these years. 
Hedging coverage as measured by the relative size of firm’s open derivative position 
was first introduced as control variable in Naito & Laux (2011) study on non-
financial US sample. They test relative size of derivative position divided by total 
assets, using fair and nominal values independently for the derivative position as 
control variables. They find weak indication that the relative nominal position size 
has positive impact on Tobin’s Q, but the results are not significant. Naito & Laux 
(2011) suggest testing with larger sample in pursue of stronger results as their 
sample consists of only 434 observations. Therefore, it is interesting to see whether 
stronger significance can be achieved using 737 observations of the Finnish market 
and if the derivatives position size has any effect on the Tobin’s Q value.  
If hedging creates positive firm value, a higher level of hedging should create more 
firm value, unless hedging is only value creating until certain level of coverage. As 
large firms are expected to have larger derivative positions than small firms, a 
relative method is used to standardize the firm size effect. Hedging coverage is 
proxied by end-of-year nominal value of open derivative contracts divided by firm’s 
total assets following Naito & Laux (2011). Comparing the nominal position to total 
assets indicates how big the open derivative position is compared to the firm size 
which gives us information of the risks related to the position.  Reporting of OTC 
derivatives and ETDs position to a trade repository became mandatory in February 
2014 as part of European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) which has further 
improved the availability of data.  However, the corporate position data is still 
poorly available from any databanks and thus the position data is collected 
manually from the firms’ financial statements. Firms which declared the use of 
derivatives but do not report the size of their open position are removed from the 
final sample, which concerns eleven out of the 748 firm year observations leaving 
737 firm year observation for the final multivariate regressions. 
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Many of the previous studies in the field have focused mainly on the effects of one 
derivative type. Allayannis & Weston (2001) study the effect of foreign currency 
derivatives, while Belghitar et al. (2008) include also interest rate derivative users in 
their study on UK sample. Jin & Jorion (2007) and Clarke et al. (2006) on the other 
hand focus on commodity derivative effects on firm value in different industries. 
Due to the small size of the Finnish market and the high correlations expected 
between derivative user sub categories, we will keep the sub categories during 
descriptive statistics and univariate analysis phase for informational purposes and 
to understand how widely firms are using different derivative types.  
For the multivariate regressions the firms will be only categorized as general 
hedgers, foreign currency hedgers, and interest rate hedgers. Commodity price 
hedgers are not tested as their own group in multivariate regressions as Table 2 
statistics show that majority of commodity price hedgers are included in the other 
hedger groups. Further it allows us to minimize the effect of high correlations 
between users of different derivative types. 
Table 3: Variables summary.  
Variables Predicted sign Definition 
Tobin's Q (ln) The natural logarithm of total assets minus book value of  
  equity plus market value of equity divided by total assets 
General hedgers (d) + Dummy variable for general derivative users 
Foreign currency hedgers (d) + Dummy variable for foreign currency derivative users 
Interest rate hedgers (d) - Dummy variable for interest rate derivative users 
Commodity price hedgers (d) +  Dummy variable for commodity price derivative users 
Size (ln) - The natural logarithm of total assets 
Leverage - Total liabilities divided by shareholder's equity 
Profitability + ROA = Net income divided by total assets 
Growth + Capital expenditures divided by total sales 
Liquidity - Current ratio = Current assets divided by current liabilities 
Access to financial markets (d) - Dummy variable for firms with dividend payment 
Negative rates (d) + Dummy variable for time period of 2015-2016 
Hedging coverage + Nominal derivative position divided by total assets 
 
 
We also acknowledge in line with Brunzell et al. (2011) that derivative users can 
include both hedgers and speculators, but since they find that most large non-
financial firms use derivatives mainly for hedging purposes we can refer to 
derivative users as hedgers. Belghitar et al. (2008) study whether separation of 
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operational hedgers from nonusers has an effect to the firm value results but find no 
significant meaning, thus we can acknowledge that nonusers group can include 
some operational hedgers. Table 3 summarizes the variable definitions and result 
predictions for the variables introduced above with predicted sign showing the 
expected relation between the variable and the dependent variable of natural 
logarithm of Tobin’s Q. 
4.1.5. Summary statistics 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of sample firms including figures for the key 
regression variables. Panel A shows details of the full sample of 748 firm year 
observations whereas Panel B shows the same figures for general derivative hedgers 
which amounts to 567 firm year observations. 181 firm year observations are left to 
Panel C and these are the firms categorized as non-users. In addition, Panel D shows 
the differences in Tobin’s Q between the different sub samples including the main 
derivative types and non-users. 
Mean value of Tobin’s Q for the whole sample is 1.55 with median value of 1.23 
which confirms that the Tobin’s Q distribution is skewed and therefore it is justified 
to use the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q as dependent variable in the multivariate 
regressions. As Tobin’s Q values are generally larger than one it indicates that the 
stocks in OMX Helsinki are currently overvalued as the companies are worth more 
than the cost of their assets. 
By looking into the Tobin’s Q values in Panels B and C we can see that the non-users 
have higher mean and median values compared to derivative users which would 
lead us to reject the first hypothesis. The Q mean value of 2.03 for non-users is 
significantly higher than 1.39 for derivative users, with median values of 1.37 and 
1.19 respectively. The significant difference between the two categories leads to 
assumption that the use of derivatives does not solely explain the difference between 
the samples. However, as we compare the maximum Q value for non-users (13.03) 
to the derivatives users (4.63) the large cap suggests that considering the sample size 
there are possibly few extreme values which are driving the difference, as minimum 
values 0.60 and 0.64 are almost equal for both samples.  
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Table 4: Sample descriptive statistics. 
Panel A: All firms             
Variables Obs,  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. 
Tobin's Q 748 1,55 1,23 13,03 0,60 1,15 
Market value of equity 748 1195447,00 188312,90 28985960,00 938,40 3173147,00 
Total sales 748 1465690,00 254675,50 42446000,00 1,00 3580266,00 
Total assets 748 1661464,00 251747,00 44901000,00 1428,00 4293932,00 
Leverage 748 0,44 0,36 7,24 -6,02 0,66 
Growth 748 0,11 0,03 16,20 0,00 0,71 
Profitability 748 0,67 3,50 97,11 -255,67 20,55 
Liquidity 748 1,57 1,36 10,08 0,09 1,12 
Dividends per share 748 0,35 0,18 3,27 0,00 0,43 
Hedging coverage 556 0,25 0,18 1,60 0,00 0,23 
Panel B: Derivative users             
Variables Obs,  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. 
Tobin's Q 567 1,39 1,19 4,63 0,60 0,63 
Market value of equity 567 1549258,00 332835,40 28985960,00 1272,76 3572524,00 
Total sales 567 1901536,00 529600,00 42446000,00 609,00 4015516,00 
Total assets 567 2162046,00 515200,00 44901000,00 5753,00 4825689,00 
Leverage 567 0,47 0,41 4,69 -3,04 0,53 
Growth 567 0,08 0,03 2,66 0,00 0,24 
Profitability 567 2,58 3,52 48,63 -65,85 10,21 
Liquidity 567 1,47 1,33 8,86 0,09 0,89 
Dividends per share 567 0,41 0,25 3,27 0,00 0,46 
Hedging coverage 556 0,25 0,18 1,60 0,00 0,23 
Panel C: Non-users             
Variables Obs,  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. 
Tobin's Q 181 2,03 1,37 13,03 0,64 1,98 
Market value of equity 181 87101,67 31154,51 1340124,00 938,40 154517,20 
Total sales 181 100360,10 49178,00 858887,00 1,00 144603,90 
Total assets 181 93339,98 43854,00 1260788,00 1428,00 171843,60 
Leverage 181 0,33 0,23 7,24 -6,02 0,96 
Growth 181 0,21 0,02 16,20 0,00 1,37 
Profitability 181 -5,33 3,08 97,11 -255,67 37,11 
Liquidity 181 1,87 1,45 10,08 0,11 1,62 
Dividends per share 181 0,15 0,04 0,95 0,00 0,21 
Hedging coverage 181 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Panel D: Tobin's Q             
Sample group Obs,  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. 
All firms 748 1,55 1,23 13,03 0,60 1,15 
General hedgers 567 1,39 1,19 4,63 0,60 0,63 
Currency hedgers  427 1,39 1,19 4,63 0,60 0,63 
Interest rate hedgers 457 1,33 1,16 3,69 0,63 0,56 
Commodity hedgers 218 1,38 1,17 3,76 0,63 0,64 
Non hedgers 181 2,03 1,37 13,03 0,64 1,98 
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Market value of equity along with total sales and total assets provides information 
if the firm size can be driving the significant differences in Tobin’s Q as shown in 
Allayannis & Weston (2001). The mean value for equity market value for the whole 
sample is 1195 million euros and as we compare it to 1549 million of derivative users 
and 87 million of non-users it is clear, that small firms are the majority in the non-
user category and derivative users are identified as large firms in line with 
Allayannis & Weston (2001) and Brunzell et al. (2011). This can be confirmed by the 
total assets (total sales) mean of 1661 (1465) million for the whole sample as the mean 
for derivative users is 2162 (1901) and 93 (100) million for the non-users. These 
figures also show how diverse the firms are by size in OMX Helsinki. 
Support for the predicted negative correlation of leverage and firm value is also 
found from Table 4 as mean (median) for the whole sample is 0.44 (0.36) with 
derivative users mean 0.47 (0.41) driving the whole sample average. Non-user mean 
of 0.33 (0.23) indicates that small firms have also lower leverage, and as Bartram et 
al. (2011) report leverage values of 0.30 (0.25) for their large international sample it 
shows that Finnish firms are more leveraged and therefore more exposed to interest 
rate risk which can explain the high percentage of interest rate hedgers in the 
sample. This negative relation between Tobin’s Q values and leverage is also 
supported by Allayannis & Weston (2001) and Belghitar et al. (2008). 
Mean growth of 0,21 for the non-users is considerably higher than 0.08 for derivative 
users which indicates that the small firms in the non-user sample are investing 
relatively larger amounts of their sales in seek of growth. This also supports the 
predicted positive sign for growth opportunities on firm value following Jin & Jorion 
(2006) and Allayannis & Weston (2001) findings. Profitability is also predicted to 
show positive relation to firm value, but instead the Finnish sample has mean ROA 
of 2.58 for derivative users with lower Tobin’s Q values as opposed to non-users 
with higher Q values and ROA of -5.33. However, the negative profitability can be 
explained by the growth firms in the non-user sample for which low income and 
high investments in assets is quite normal relation. Also, the minimum value of -
255.67 ROA in the non-user sample shows that considering the sample size there are 
few firms with extremely low ROA figures which bias the mean in the non-user 
sample.  
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Liquidity and ability to access capital markets measure the firm value through cash 
flows and liquid assets. For liquidity the mean (median) of 1.87 (1.45) for non-users 
is higher than 1.47 (1.33) and 1.57 (1.36) for derivative users and the whole sample 
respectively in line with previous literature as Bartram (2000) finds that firms with 
low liquidity are more prone to use derivatives. Dividend yield or dividend per 
share is expectedly larger for the derivative users than non-users, given that we have 
acknowledged that the samples are quite strongly characterized by the differences 
between large and small firms. For the regression analysis a dividend dummy is 
used instead to standardize the differences in small and large firms as dividend 
payers. This is following Allayannis & Weston (2001) as firms that pay dividend are 
considered to have better cash balance and therefore able to undergo negative net 
present value projects which then leads to lower Tobin’s Q value. Thus, negative 
correlation is expected for the dividend dummy and Q value, the analysis part will 
show if findings from Table 4 can be updated.  In addition, the mean (median) of 
hedging coverage for derivative users is 0.25 showing that the average open 
derivative positions are 25 % of the value of firms’ total assets.  
Panel D in Table 4 compares the Tobin’s Q values between derivative user 
subsamples and non-users. As expressed earlier it is challenging to find significant 
differences in Q values between diverse types of hedging as most firms in every 
hedger sub group have also open position in at least one other group. This is shown 
in Panel D as currency hedgers have the same mean and median values as the 
general hedgers sample. Slight differences are found with interest rate hedgers 
which have the lowest mean of 1.33 compared to 1.39 of the general hedgers, which 
indicates possible support for the third hypothesis of negative value premium 
caused by negative market rate environment. Following that the interest rate 
hedgers are also the biggest sub sample group with 457 firms out of 567 having open 
position in interest rate derivatives, it appears the reported values for different type 
of hedgers are influenced by hedging multiple risk exposures simultaneously. 
However, the high leverage values introduced in Panel B are in line with Allayannis 
& Weston (2001) and Belghitar et al. (2008) as leveraged firms are expected to have 
lower Tobin’s Q values. These correlations are further examined in the following 
analysis part of the thesis. 
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4.2. Methodology 
Following the prior literature in hedging and firm value studies the main hypothesis 
is tested by reviewing differences in Tobin’s Q values for derivative users and non-
users. The positive value premium found by Allayannis & Weston (2001) and 
Bartram et al. (2011) is tested first in univariate tests including comparisons between 
different years during the sample period and derivative sub categories against non-
users. Simple mean and median tests are carried out as well as correlations 
comparisons between the regression variables introduced in Data section. 
As firm value is affected by multiple factors the analysis is continued in multivariate 
regression tests where the control variables are added to rule out value effects from 
other variables than use of derivatives. To see if Allayannis & Weston (2001) value 
premium can be found using the Finnish sample a pooled OLS regression method is 
applied added with fixed effects OLS regressions. In addition, a new control variable 
for hedging coverage is introduced and tested to see if a wide hedging strategy 
supports the possible value benefits gained by hedgers. 
4.2.1. Univariate analysis 
The univariate analysis part presents results from Tobin’s Q mean and median tests 
to see if the findings from OMX Helsinki firms are following previous literature like 
Allayannis & Weston (2001) and Belghitar et al (2008). For the mean and median 
tests, the sample is divided into two time-windows to see if the negative interest rate 
market environment provides diverse results compared to positive rate 
environment, as prior literature results are all from the era of positive interest rates. 
Hedgers are further categorized into subgroups based on the main derivative types: 
foreign exchange hedgers, interest rate hedgers and commodity price hedgers. The 
results will indicate how the Tobin’s Q values presented in Table 4 are formed and 
if the time effects or hedging with specific derivative type are driving the results. 
Additionally, mean and median tests are applied to see if firms which used only 
either foreign currency derivative or interest rate derivatives separately fared better 
when compared to non-users. Finally, findings from the correlation matrix for the 
multivariate regression variables are also examined. 
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Table 5 divides the sample into to two according to the market interest rate 
environment. As the Euribor rates were first noted below zero in April 2015, the 
period of positive rates accounts for firm observations from the year 2010 to 2014, 
whereas negative rates period includes the data from the final years in the sample 
period, 2015 and 2016. As the data is based on end-of-year figures collected annually, 
the year 2015 can be included in the negative rates period regardless that the first 
months of 2015 were still under positive rate environment. Table 5 results include 
all 748 firm year observations with 240 observations during negative rates and 508 
during positive rate environment in Panel A and for Panels B to D the number of 
observations changes as other hedgers than the one tested in each Panel are not 
included in the sample. Due to the skewness in Tobin’s Q distribution noted earlier, 
both mean and median values are included in the analysis. Mean and median tests 
determine if the Tobin’s Q mean and median values of hedgers differ from the Q 
values of non-hedgers. The significance levels are determined based on p-values 
obtained from t-test in mean tests, while median test p-values are collected using 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. T-statistic under 1.645 is considered significant at 10 
% level, while t-statistic of 1.96 or higher denotes 5 % significance and t-stat of 2.58 
or higher is highly significant at 1 % level. 
Panel A shows how general hedgers performed against non-hedgers during 
negative and positive rate periods. Tobin’s Q value presented in Table 4 for the 
whole sample were 1.55 and 1.39 (2.03) for the general hedgers (non-hedgers) 
respectively. The results from Panel A show that mean difference between general 
hedgers and non-hedgers during the positive rates period is considerable lower -
0.23 compared to -0,64 difference from the whole period in Table 4, though highly 
significant at 1% while difference in median values is also negative but insignificant. 
However, mean difference during negative rates is -1,12 with high significance at 
1% including highly significant negative difference in median values as well. These 
findings suggest that the negative value premium for general hedgers is mainly 
driven by the negative rates period which contrasts with Allayannis & Weston (2001) 
and is more in line with Khediri & Folus (2010) and Nguyen & Faff (2007). Panels B 
to D provide information on if the mean and median differences noted in Panel A 
vary between different derivative type hedgers and further provide evidence for the 
second and third hypothesis. However, the result for the general hedgers is 
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considered more reliable as the observations in hedger sub categories are 
overlapping as discussed before. Due to the sample separation between positive and 
negative interest rates, results of interest rate hedgers versus non-hedgers is 
expected to show higher negative premium for hedgers in line with the third 
hypothesis. 
Table 5: Tobin’s Q mean and median tests by market environment and derivative 
type. 
Tobin's Q   Positive rates   Negative rates   
    Mean   Median Obs Mean   Median Obs 
                    
Panel A: General                 
  Hedgers 1,36   1,16 406 1,47   1,29 161 
  Non-hedgers 1,59   1,23 102 2,59   1,71 79 
  Difference -0,23   -0,07   -1,12   -0,42   
  p-value 0,0040***   0,1894   0,0000***   0,0000***   
  Total obs       508       240 
                    
Panel B: Foreign currency                 
  Hedgers 1,36   1,15 311 1,48   1,32 116 
  Non-hedgers 1,59   1,23 102 2,59   1,71 79 
  Difference -0,23   -0,08   -1,11   -0,39   
  p-value 0,0082***   0,1748   0,0000***   0,0004***   
  Total obs       413       195 
                    
Panel C: Interest rate                 
  Hedgers 1,30   1,15 324 1,40   1,21 133 
  Non-hedgers 1,59   1,23 102 2,59   1,71 79 
  Difference -0,29   -0,08   -1,19   -0,50   
  p-value 0,0003***   0,0645*   0,0000***   0,0000***   
  Total obs       426       212 
                    
Panel D: Commodity                 
  Hedgers 1,34   1,10 158 1,49   1,31 60 
  Non-hedgers 1,59   1,23 102 2,59   1,71 79 
  Difference -0,25   -0,13   -1,10   -0,40   
  p-value 0,0192**   0,0500**   0,0019***   0,0031***   
  Total obs       260       139 
  ***,** and * imply 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.       
 
Following the negative difference found for general hedgers, foreign currency 
hedgers in Panel B have slightly lower Tobin’s Q values with -0,23 value difference 
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significant at 1 % level during positive rates, but for the negative rates period the 
mean difference is noted at -1,11 and median difference at-0,39 with both highly 
significant. The foreign currency hedger and non-hedger groups are more balanced 
in number of observations during negative rates while in the positive rate sample 
the hedgers outweigh non-hedgers by three to one. As the negative value premium 
is considerable for foreign currency hedgers and the interest rate environment factor 
should be more effective on interest rate hedgers, it is likely that the result is driven 
by firms which belong to both hedging groups.  
Panel C shows the largest value difference out of the three hedging groups for 
interest rate hedgers with highly significant mean (median) difference of -0,29 (-0,08) 
during years from 2010 to 2014. The negative rates period shows also the largest and 
highly significant negative difference in Q values between hedgers (1,40) and non-
hedgers (2,59) in line with differences shown in Panel A and B, which confirms that 
the negative hedging premium seems to be driven by the most recent years in the 
sample period and further the interest rate hedgers appear to drive the negative 
premium shown for the general hedgers which would leave to the confirmation of 
the third hypothesis. 
The results from mean and median tests in Panel D for commodity hedgers are also 
in line with the findings from foreign currency and interest rate hedgers and 
throughout highly significant. Due to the small sample size and the fact that most of 
the commodity hedgers (94 %) have an open position in at least one of the other 
derivative segments, the Panel D Tobin’s Q values are considered biased by other 
hedger groups. Therefore, commodity price hedgers are not included in Table 6 as 
their own group where the possible value effects of hedging with only single type 
of derivatives are tested. 
The univariate tests in Table 5 show no support for the first and second hypothesis 
but instead are indicating that the value premium might be rejected for both general 
and individual derivative type hedgers and the negative value premium hypothesis 
confirmed for interest rate hedgers. 
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To further evaluate the assumption in second hypothesis, table 6 presents Tobin’s Q 
values for firms which used only foreign currency derivatives (Panel A) or interest 
rate derivatives (Panel B). The results are compared against non-hedgers as in Table 
5, to see if hedging only one specific risk exposure can lead to a higher Q value than 
hedging with multiple derivative types. When foreign currency hedgers are isolated 
the difference between hedgers and non-hedgers is positive which was not present 
in Table 5 statistics, and thus in line with Allayannis & Weston (2001) findings. 
However, results here are insignificant for both time periods excluding the positive 
median difference during positive rates with only 10 % significance.  
Table 6: Mean and median tests for hedging with single derivative type. 
Tobin's Q   Positive rates   Negative rates   
    Mean   Median Obs Mean   Median Obs 
                    
Panel A: Foreign currency                 
  Hedgers 1,7   1,38 52 1,98   1,47 14 
  Non-hedgers 1,59   1,23 102 2,59   1,71 79 
  Difference 0,11   0,15   -0,61   -0,24   
  p-value 0,5345   0,0625*   0,3954   0,9700   
  Total obs       154       93 
                    
Panel B: Interest rate                 
  Hedgers 1,3   1,19 83 1,33   0,98 39 
  Non-hedgers 1,59   1,23 102 2,59   1,71 79 
  Difference -0,29   -0,04   -1,26   -0,73   
  p-value 0,0227**   0,2641   0,0040***   0,0000***   
  Total obs       185       118 
  ***,** and * imply 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.       
 
Panel B on the contrary follows the findings in Table 5 with -0,29 difference during 
positive rates period, but strong and highly significant negative difference of -1,26 
during negative rates. These results are expected and strengthen the assumption that 
negative hedging premium is driven by interest rate hedgers which is especially 
valid during negative rates period from 2015 to 2016. The findings in Tables 5 and 6 
are disputing Allayannis & Weston (2001) and Belghitar et al. (2008) findings as well 
as many of the previous literature findings and the main hypotheses in this thesis. 
Therefore, further analysis with multivariate regression is needed to see which 
factors other than hedging are driving the negative value premium noted here.  
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For estimating firm value effect of derivatives with OLS regression there are 
conditions to be met if we seek to avoid biased coefficient results. The OLS 
assumptions are introduced further in the multivariate analysis chapter, but to see 
if chosen independent and control variables are in breach of OLS assumption MLR.3 
a correlation matrix is reviewed in Table 7. MLR.3 is one of the five OLS assumptions 
which need to be met or controlled to confirm unbiased regression results. MLR.3 is 
the “No Perfect Collinearity” assumption according to which none of the 
independent variables can be constant and no exact linear relationships can exist 
among the independent variables. (Wooldridge 2009: 84–94.)  
Table 7: Pearson correlation matrix. 
 
Table 7 shows the correlations between dependent and independent variables where 
the p-values are presented in parenthesis below the correlation coefficients to 
determine the significance levels. The correlations in Table 7 vary from -0,349 to 
0,647 and are mostly rather low, thus we can conclude that MRL.3 requirements are 
met, and perfect collinearity does not exist. If two or more of the regression variables 
have high but not perfect collinearity, the sample has multicollinearity, which is 
Correlation matrix
(p-value) Tobin's Q 
(ln)
General 
hedgers Size (ln) Growth Leverage Liquidity Profitability
Access to 
financial 
Negative 
rates
Hedging 
coverage
Tobin's Q (ln) 1,000
----- 
General hedgers -0,217*** 1,000
(0,000) ----- 
Size (ln) -0,183*** 0,550*** 1,000
(0,000) (0,000) ----- 
Growth 0,199*** -0,077** -0,121*** 1,000
(0,000) (0,038) (0,001) ----- 
Leverage -0,228*** 0,091** 0,177*** -0,083** 1,000
(0,000) (0,014) (0,000) (0,025) ----- 
Liquidity 0,231*** -0,150*** -0,186*** 0,153*** -0,094** 1,000
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,011) ----- 
Profitability -0,036 0,170*** 0,216*** -0,349*** 0,028 0,065* 1,000
(0,334) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,451) (0,080) ----- 
Access to 0,037 0,238*** 0,346*** -0,077** -0,087** 0,029 0,410*** 1,000
financial markets (0,319) (0,000) (0,000) (0,037) (0,019) (0,430) (0,000) ----- 
Negative rates 0.178*** -0.140*** -0.052 0.082** 0.011 0.066* -0.040 0.002 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.159) (0.026) (0.760) (0.074) (0.284) (0.965) ----- 
Hedging coverage -0,167*** 0,479*** 0,647*** -0,036 0,087** -0,091** 0,085** 0,159*** -0.073** 1,000
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,326) (0,019) (0,014) (0,021) (0,000) (0.049) ----- 
***,** and * imply 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.
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ruled out by taking a closer look on the correlation coefficients. The natural 
logarithm of Tobin’s Q as dependent variable has expected and highly significant 
negative correlations with general hedgers, size, leverage and hedging coverage 
with the highest coefficient of leverage -0,228. In line with previous literature large 
and highly leveraged firms have lower Q values, but in contrast to Belghitar et al. 
(2008) the value premium looks to be negative for general hedgers and is supported 
by negative correlation between Q value and the size of derivative position. Positive 
correlations for ln Q are growth, liquidity and negative rates which confirms that Q 
values for the overall sample are higher during negative rates.  
For general hedgers all correlations are significant at least at 5 % level, with small 
negative correlations for growth, liquidity and negative rates. The high positive 
correlations for size, access to financial markets and hedging coverage are expected 
as general hedgers are characterized as large firms which tend to pay dividends. 
High positive coefficients for size against access to financial markets (0.346) and 
hedging coverage (0.647) confirm the above and further indicate that large firms 
tend to have relatively larger derivative positions. With these findings it is 
concluded that there are no multicollinearity problems with the independent 
variables as there are only few isolated high correlations not greater than 0.647. 
Overall the correlation coefficients in Table 7 are expected and in line with previous 
literature for the most part, added with the new findings regarding negative market 
rates and hedging coverage. Though, the results are in contrast on the account of 
value premium noted for derivative users. Further analysis on the value premium 
and dependencies between the variables is conducted in OLS multivariate 
regressions in the following chapter.  
4.2.2. Multivariate analysis 
To capture the factors affecting firm value and the possible value effect of hedging, 
multivariate regression models are estimated on the OMX Helsinki sample. The 
multivariate analysis part consists of introduction of OLS assumptions, and further 
regression models for pooled OLS regression and fixed effects OLS regression are 
determined.  
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The Ordinary-Least-Squares or OLS regression is widely used through existing 
literature to estimate the coefficients in multivariate regression models. In OLS 
regression, the sum of squared residuals is minimized meaning that OLS model 
reduces distance between the actual sample observations and the chosen linear 
regression model. The data set used here is characterized as panel data with several 
cross-sections but employing the OLS pooled regression means that the observations 
are pooled together resulting in broken panel structure. In order for the OLS 
estimators to be considered unbiased, a set of pre-defined assumptions have to be 
met. The Gauss-Markov OLS assumptions are listed from one to five as multiple 
regression model (MLR) conditions. MRL.1 (Linear in Parameters) defines the 
general form of multivariate regression and states that the dependent variable is 
linearly formed by set of chosen independent variables and the error term. MLR.2 
(Random Sampling) defines that the sample must consist of random observations 
and thus the expected error term is equal to zero. According to MLR.3 (No Perfect 
Collinearity) any chosen independent variable cannot be perfect linear combination 
of the other independent variables, a condition for which the variable correlations 
were compared in Table 7. MLR.4 (Zero Conditional Mean) is considered the most 
important of the assumptions stating that the error term in the model has an 
expected value of zero given any values of the independent variables. And finally, 
MLR.5 (Homoskedasticity) states that the variance of error terms has to remain 
unchanged with any given values of independent variables, otherwise the errors are 
considered heteroskedastic. (Wooldridge 2009; 84–94.) 
Pooled OLS regression allows for the sample to vary between observation years and 
as a large part of the sample firms are included every year, the statistical significance 
is increased by getting rid of the panel structure and pooling the cross-sections 
across time. As the panel structure is ignored, controlling for time effects with 
negative rates dummy variable provides relevant information of the value effect in 
different market environments. Table 8 shows the variation in Tobin’s Q values 
through to sample period from 2010 to 2016. When considering the largest increase 
in Q values from 2014 to 2015 present in Table 8 which demonstrates the time effect, 
and the fact that the number of cross-sections (firms) is large and the duration of 
time period (years) short, fixed effects regressions are applied in addition to pooled 
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OLS regressions to improve the goodness of fit for this panel data. (Wooldridge 2009: 
444–449.) 
Table 8: Tobin’s Q values by year. 
All firms 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Mean 1,48 1,24 1,28 1,51 1,50 1,80 1,87 
Median 1,26 1,09 1,12 1,22 1,22 1,33 1,45 
Observations 98 98 100 104 108 117 123 
                
General hedgers             
Mean 1,49 1,24 1,27 1,43 1,38 1,42 1,52 
Median 1,27 1,05 1,12 1,17 1,22 1,20 1,31 
Observations 82 82 80 82 80 80 81 
                
Non-users               
Mean 1,44 1,26 1,35 1,82 1,87 2,64 2,55 
Median 1,24 1,22 1,10 1,52 1,23 1,57 1,73 
Observations 16 16 20 22 28 37 42 
 
The first model is pooled OLS regression with natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q as 
dependent variable, general hedgers as the independent variable of interest and the 
following control variables: Size, leverage, profitability, growth, liquidity, ability to 
access financial markets and negative rates.   
(8)  Tobin’s Q (ln) = β0 + β1general hedgers + β2size + β3leverage + β4growth + 
β5profitability + β6liquidity + β7access to financial markets + β8negative rates 
Further pooled OLS regressions are estimated for the effect of hedging with interest 
rate and foreign currency derivatives specifically. The individual effect of 
commodity price hedgers is left out of the models due to the low number of 
observations and high overlapping percentage with interest rate and foreign 
currency hedgers. Models 8 and 9 provide evidence the first two hypotheses 
concerning value premium expectations of general and foreign currency hedgers 
and Model 10 is used for testing the use of interest rate derivatives effect on firm 
value.  
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(9) Tobin’s Q (ln) = β0 + β1foreign currency hedgers + β2size + β3leverage + 
β4growth + β5profitability + β6liquidity + β7access to financial markets + 
β8negative rates 
(10) Tobin’s Q (ln) = β0 + β1interest rate hedgers + β2size + β3leverage + β4growth 
+ β5profitability + β6liquidity + β7access to financial markets + β8negative rates 
Models 8,9 and 10 are estimated for the whole sample of 748 firm year observations 
and are constructed mainly of variables that are proven in many of the previous 
studies to affect firm value, including Allayannis & Weston (2001), Belghitar et al. 
(2008), Bartram et al. (2011) and Khediri & Folus (2010). The control variables for 
negative rates brings additional information as the data is more recent and the 
market environment rather unusual but controlling for time effects itself is a relevant 
factor also in previous literature. The data for hedging coverage control variable is 
manually collected from the firm annual reports.  Hedging coverage measures the 
relative size of open derivative position by dividing the nominal value of the 
position by firm’s total assets and thus comparable among different firm sizes. Due 
to missing information for derivative positions, 11 firms are deleted from the sample 
leaving 737 observations for the final sample. Hedging coverage is added as control 
variable to test the fourth hypothesis as Models 11, 12 and 13 are formed.  
(11) Tobin’s Q (ln) = β0 + β1general hedgers + β2size + β3leverage + β4growth + 
β5profitability + β6liquidity + β7access to financial markets + β8negative rates 
+ β9hedging coverage  
(12) Tobin’s Q (ln) = β0 + β1foreign currency hedgers + β2size + β3leverage + 
β4growth + β5profitability + β6liquidity + β7access to financial markets + 
β8negative rates+ β9hedging coverage 
(13) Tobin’s Q (ln) = β0 + β1interest rate hedgers + β2size + β3leverage + β4growth 
+ β5profitability + β6liquidity + β7access to financial markets + β8negative rates 
β9hedging coverage 
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Before the results for the OLS regression models above can be reviewed, the OLS 
assumptions introduced earlier are tested to see if the chosen regression model is a 
good estimator for the regression parameters. If the assumptions from MLR.1 to 
MLR.5 are met, variables chosen are the best linear unbiased estimators (BLUE). 
(Wooldridge 2009: 103.) After plotting the dependent variable Tobin’s Q against the 
independent variables, it is confirmed that Tobin’s Q is linear combination of the 
independent variables and therefore MLR.1 holds for the equation. MLR.2 holds 
true if the expected error term (residuals) is equal to zero. This is confirmed by 
plotting the residuals of Tobin’s Q versus the fitted values and since the residuals 
are evenly distributed around zero, the expected value is zero, thus MLR.2 holds. 
The evidence for third assumption MLR.3 is presented in Table 7 correlation matrix 
showing that perfect collinearity does not exist among independent variables 
confirming the MLR.3 assumption. Heteroskedasticity problem is quite frequent in 
economic OLS models and also present here as the Durbin-Watson stat for the 
equation is low, thus achieving MLR.5 assumption for homoscedastic standard 
errors requires controlling for heteroscedasticity. To control for heteroscedasticity, 
White’s cross-section method is used in all OLS regressions which provides 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors without significantly changing the 
estimation output and better reliability on the significance of the results as measured 
by t-statistics and p-values. (Wooldridge 2009: 271–276.) 
Finally, MLR.4 requires that the mean of the error term does not depend on the 
values of the independent variables, if such dependence is found the errors are 
called autocorrelated. Autocorrelation is a problem that often exists in economic 
pooled OLS regression models, since there are several macroeconomic factors which 
can and usually do change over the years and thus affecting the dependent variable, 
such as GDP growth here. When estimating the effect of hedging to firm market 
value it is important to acknowledge the possibility of autocorrelation since the 
growth of GDP over the years for instance surely affects firm values and therefore 
Tobin’s Q values in the sample and causes the pooled OLS regression to be biased. 
To be able to control for the autocorrelation in panel data pooled OLS regression, 
the number of time periods would have to be large and the number of cross-sections 
small. Our panel data for OMX Helsinki firms has the opposite characteristics as the 
number of cross-sections (firms) considered here is large and the sample period 
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relatively short. Running fixed effects regression has better statistical abilities for this 
kind of panel data characteristics and it is able to correct for autocorrelation, and 
additionally for heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity. The fixed effects model 
should not change the regression coefficients remarkably, but most likely the 
goodness of fit as measured by R-square is expected to improve. The limitations and 
advantages of fixed effects model are that any time-constant variables, if such exist 
in the model, cannot be included among the independent variables. This causes no 
changes to models introduced earlier as sector dummies or other similar constant 
variables were not added to the Models to begin with. Therefore, fixed effects 
regressions are estimated for all the Models from 8 to 13 and results are presented 
along with OLS pooled regressions in tables 9 and 10 in the next chapter. 
(Wooldridge 2009: 481–489.) 
4.3. Results 
Use of derivatives and firm value effect is widely studied in prior academic literature 
with variety of samples and research angles. Allayannis & Weston (2001) findings 
for positive value premium of 4,87 % among foreign currency hedgers set the 
ground for many others to approach the subject. This chapter presents the results 
from multivariate regressions on the OMX Helsinki sample to see if the Allayannis 
& Weston (2001) findings and the hypotheses in this thesis can be confirmed or if the 
preliminary results from the univariate tests showing signs of negative value 
premium among Finnish derivative hedgers are repeated in pooled OLS and fixed 
effects regressions.  
4.3.1. Univariate results 
The sample characteristics show 46,04 % higher Tobin’s Q value for non-users than 
general hedgers, a significant difference which cannot be explained solely by the 
hedging activities as the hedgers are quite strongly characterized as large firms 
whereas non-users are mainly small firms. Tobin’s Q as a measure is comparable 
between different sized firms, but as firm size has been confirmed in previous 
literature to affect the firm value more robust estimations are needed. Furthermore, 
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Tobin’s Q differences are tested in mean and median tests by dividing the sample 
into two time periods following the changes in interest rate market environment. 
Positive rates period from 2010 to 2014 shows -16,91 % negative premium for general 
hedgers whereas the difference is considerably stronger during the negative rates 
period with highly significant -76,19 % negative hedging premium. The result is 
repeated when interest rate hedgers and foreign currency hedgers are compared 
against non-hedgers with both sub categories showing sizeable negative difference 
during 2015–2016 compared to the more moderate difference during the first five 
years of in the sample period. Repeating the test with firms that hedge only with 
interest rate or foreign exchange derivatives shows significant negative premium in 
Tobin’s Q for interest rate hedgers, in line with findings in Table 6 with the entire 
sample. The correlation matrix in Table 7 further indicates a highly significant 
negative relation between general derivative hedgers and Tobin’s Q value. These 
findings indicate rejection of the first and second hypothesis but provide evidence 
for the third hypothesis instead. 
The prior literature has revealed positive value premium for hedgers in numerous 
studies along with Allayannis & Weston (2001). Pramborg (2004) finds positive 
value premium for general hedgers using the Swedish sample, Carter et al. (2006) 
find the same with U.S airlines and commodity hedgers while Belghitar et al. (2008) 
find a significant value premium for interest rate and foreign currency hedgers 
among U.K. firms. Documented findings for negative value premium are harder to 
find, but Khediri & Folus (2010) with French sample and Nguyen & Faff (2007) with 
Australian sample find evidence of negative value effect for hedgers, Nguyen & Faff 
(2007) especially for interest rate hedgers. Even though the univariate results are 
rather surprising considering the large and significant difference to many of the 
prior literature findings, the fact that negative value effects have been indicated also 
with French and Australian firms suggests that support for the third hypothesis is 
possible from the OMX Helsinki sample as well. The following chapter presents the 
results from pooled OLS regressions and fixed effects regressions.  
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4.3.2. Multivariate results 
Table 9 presents the results for model 8 (general hedgers), 9 (foreign currency 
hedgers) and 10 (interest rate hedgers) and Table 10 for models 11 – 13 which 
included hedging coverage as control variable. Next to pooled OLS regression 
coefficients, fixed effects results are shown for each model independently with p-
values in parenthesis below the coefficients to determine the significance level. The 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Tobin’s for all the regression models. 
Control variables used in the models from 8 to 13 are introduced in Table 3 along 
with the expected signs for each variable. 
The sample used in Table 9 regressions includes all the 748 firm year observations 
as firms with missing data for hedging coverage are included in these results. All 
the models are ran using robust standard errors by White method to control for 
heteroscedasticity. R-squared denotes the goodness-of-fit for the regression models, 
which shows how much of the variation in Tobin’s Q can be explained by each 
model. (Wooldridge 2009: 40.) As discussed earlier, pooled OLS regression models 
ran on panel data suffer from heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation which is 
reflected in the weak R-squared figures of 16,3 % for model 8 of general hedgers, 
and 15,4 % (17,2 %) for foreign currency model (interest rate model) respectively. 
The goodness-of-fit is considerably higher with the fixed effects models with 
explanatory level over 80 % for each of the models in Table 9 proving the fixed effects 
regression provides more robust results on panel data with short time period and 
high number of cross-sections.  
Table 9 results from pooled OLS regression model 8 for general hedgers continue 
the findings in univariate tests and indicate negative value premium for general 
hedgers of -13,07 % with high significance at 1 %. The fixed effects regression for 
general hedgers confirms the negative effect with -6,56 % premium, which is also 
highly significant. These findings are strongly in contrast with the base study of 
Allayannis & Weston (2001) and lead us to reject the first hypothesis, but more in 
line with Khediri & Folus (2010) and Nguyen & Faff (2007). Firm size as natural 
logarithm is in line with the predicted negative sign showing highly significant 
negative relation for both pooled and fixed effects regressions, also in line with the  
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Table 9: Pooled OLS & fixed effects results for general, foreign currency and interest 
rate hedgers. 
  
previous literature. Growth variable is highly significant and positive as in pooled 
regression as expected but turns significant and negative in the fixed effects 
estimation. What is distinct in Models throughout Table 9 is that profitability factor 
is almost non-existent and insignificant in all the models showing no value premium 
for profitable firms. Liquidity shows significant positive relation in pooled OLS 
regression, but the significance is not repeated in fixed effects. Access to financial 
markets measured by dividend dummy is in line with prior literature and 
expectations and shows positive value premium ranging from 6,61 % to 7,75 % and 
significant in at least 10 % in all the models thus confirming that dividend payments 
have been rewarded with value by investors through the sample period. Finally, the 
negative rates dummy showing positive and highly significant coefficient through 
Tobin's Q (ln)
Pooled Fixed Pooled Fixed Pooled Fixed
Observations 748
R-squared 0,163 0,800 0,154 0,803 0,172 0,800
Constant 0,4524 *** 3,3521 *** 0,4800 *** 3,2780 *** 0,3975 *** 3,3412 ***
(p-value) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
GEN hedgers -0,1307 *** -0,0656 ***
(0,005) (0,002)
FCD hedgers -0,0301 -0,1485 ***
(0,139) (0,000)
IRD hedgers -0,1524 *** -0,0508 **
(0,000) (0,042)
Size (ln) -0,0161 *** -0,2486 *** -0,0253 *** -0,2399 *** -0,0127 *** -0,2491 ***
(0,001) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Leverage -0,1181 *** 0,0216 -0,1198 *** 0,0244 -0,1121 *** 0,0211
(0,005) (0,312) (0,005) (0,244) (0,006) (0,335)
Growth 0,0917 *** -0,0617 ** 0,0899 *** -0,0601 *** 0,0949 *** -0,0616 **
(0,000) (0,011) (0,000) (0,008) (0,000) (0,011)
Profitability 0,0004 -0,0009 0,0002 -0,0009 0,0002 -0,0009
(0,692) (0,118) (0,807) (0,112) (0,800) (0,112)
Liquidity 0,0614 *** 0,0107 0,0654 *** 0,0121 0,0593 *** 0,0112
(0,001) (0,618) (0,001) (0,573) (0,001) (0,596)
Access to 0,0708 ** 0,0771 ** 0,0661 * 0,0756 * 0,0775 * 0,0730 **
financial markets (0,078) (0,036) (0,095) (0,063) (0,058) (0,033)
Negative rates 0,1309 *** 0,1185 *** 0,1414 *** 0,1127 *** 0,1353 *** 0,1210 ***
(0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,000) (0,000)
***,** and * imply 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
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Table 9 confirms the indications from Tables 5 and 8 that the increase in Tobin’s Q 
values are driven by the observations from years 2015 and 2016.  
Although the negative rates dummy was chosen in the basis of unusual market rates 
environment, it is acknowledged that GDP growth and other macroeconomic factors 
rising from the economic recovery in Finland during 2015 and 2016 is affecting the 
Tobin’s Q values, and those factors are not independently included in these 
estimations. The highly significant and positive coefficients estimated for the 
constant in each of the regressions suggest that there are exogenous factors leading 
to increase in firm valuations.  (Tilastokeskus 2018.) 
The second hypothesis stating that use of foreign currency or commodity price 
derivatives specifically is rewarded with positive value premium can be examined 
in Models 9, excluding the commodity price hedging effect. Model 9 in Table 9 
estimates the value effect of foreign currency hedgers for which the pooled model 
finds no significant relation, but instead the highly significant negative premium of 
-14,85 % is estimated in fixed effects regression confirming the Model 8 results and 
indicating that foreign currency hedgers are rewarded with negative premium in 
contrast to second hypothesis based on Allayannis & Weston (2001) findings. For 
foreign currency hedgers the control variables are line with general hedgers 
coefficients with only minor changes in significance levels for growth and access to 
capital markets variables. For interest rate hedgers pooled regression estimates with 
Model 10 show strong negative value premium of -15,24 % significant at 1 % which 
is in line with earlier findings from Tables 5 & 6 and following Nguyen & Faff (2007) 
findings and providing evidence of accepting the third hypothesis. The result is 
further confirmed with lower but still negative and significant -5,08 % premium in 
the fixed effects regression. When considering the control variables, the coefficients 
are widely in line with the previous models with firm size having negative and 
significant relation throughout confirming the earlier findings and prior literature 
results that small firms tend to have value premium over large firms. Further the 
negative relation for growth firms is noted in all three fixed regression estimates 
indicating that firms with growth opportunities are not currently rewarded with 
value premium.  
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As discussed earlier foreign currency hedger and interest rate hedger groups are 
partially overlapping as majority of hedgers in OMX Helsinki are using both 
derivative types. Therefore, distinct difference in the value premium between 
currency and interest rate hedging is difficult to prove with the current data, but the 
individual models provide additional information on the findings for general 
hedgers and further contribute to the existing academic literature of derivative and 
firm value studies. To study the differences in hedging premiums between different 
derivative type categories, a much larger and preferably international sample is 
needed as for instance commodity price hedgers cannot be tested as individual 
group with the current data from OMX Helsinki due to the small number of 
observations and strong correlation with foreign currency and interest rate hedger 
groups.  
Table 10 presents the regression results from Models 11 – 13 including coefficients 
for both pooled OLS regression and fixed effects regression. Hedging coverage is 
added as control variable to find support for the fourth hypothesis, if the relative 
position size is a factor contributing to Tobin’s Q value. Adding hedging coverage 
among control variables has slightly increased the goodness-of-fit for the models in 
both pooled and fixed effect estimates, the increase being 20 – 30 basis points in fixed 
effects models and 20 – 90 basis points in pooled OLS regressions. The number of 
observations decreased from Table 9 following the removal of firms with missing 
data for the hedging coverage control variable, but the sample is still far greater by 
size compared to Naito & Laux (2011) who faced problems with insignificant 
coefficients caused by the small sample size.  
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Table 10: Pooled OLS & fixed effects results including control for hedging coverage. 
 
Model 11 shows highly significant and negative value premium of -13,77 % for 
general hedgers which is relative unchanged from -13,07 % premium found by 
Model 9 in pooled OLS regression and still supports rejection of the first hypothesis. 
However, the fixed effect coefficient for Model 11 is negative but insignificant due 
to high reported p-value. Whether this change is caused by the hedging coverage 
variable leading Model 11 to provide better estimate for Tobin’s Q, or the high 
correlation between hedging coverage and general hedgers is causing the result to 
be biased, is debatable in lack of further research on the matter. Furthermore, the 
control variables for general hedgers in Table 10 are in line with Table 9 findings and 
expectations for the most part with only few counts of higher p-value. Hedging 
Tobin's Q (ln)
Pooled Fixed Pooled Fixed Pooled Fixed
Observations 737
R-squared 0,172 0,803 0,161 0,805 0,177 0,803
Constant 0,3107 *** 3,5900 *** 0,3278 *** 3,5067 *** 0,3061 *** 3,5603 ***
(p-value) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
GEN hedgers -0,1377 *** -0,0303
(0,003) (0,429)
FCD hedgers -0,0194 -0,1098 ***
(0,357) (0,004)
IRD hedgers -0,1486 *** -0,0527 *
(0,000) (0,071)
Size (ln) -0,0026 -0,2680 *** -0,0108 *** -0,2586 *** -0,0045 -0,2650 ***
(0,142) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,184) (0,000)
Leverage -0,1255 *** 0,0241 -0,1273 *** 0,0256 -0,1181 *** 0,0234
(0,008) (0,282) (0,008) (0,248) (0,010) (0,295)
Growth 0,0951 *** -0,0632 ** 0,0934 *** -0,0610 *** 0,0972 *** -0,0625 **
(0,000) (0,012) (0,000) (0,010) (0,000) (0,014)
Profitability 0,0004 -0,0009 0,0003 -0,0008 0,0003 -0,0009
(0,638) (0,139) (0,756) (0,151) (0,760) (0,139)
Liquidity 0,0618 *** 0,0094 0,0657 *** 0,0104 0,0594 *** 0,0097
(0,000) (0,661) (0,000) (0,631) (0,001) (0,651)
Access to 0,0696 * 0,0798 ** 0,0608 0,0789 ** 0,0764 ** 0,0769 **
financial markets (0,076) (0,030) (0,131) (0,047) (0,049) (0,027)
Negative rates 0,1324 *** 0,1151 *** 0,1438 *** 0,1107 *** 0,1374 *** 0,1148 ***
(0,001) (0,001) (0,000) (0,001) (0,000) (0,001)
Hedging -0,1307 *** -0,0976 -0,1780 *** -0,0718 -0,0833 -0,0792
coverage (0,003) (0,159) (0,000) (0,268) (0,115) (0,243)
***,** and * imply 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.
Model 11 Model 12 Model 13
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coverage itself is estimated to have -13,07 % negative and highly significant 
premium in the pooled OLS model indicating that larger derivative positions do not 
lead to higher firm value, though coefficient in the fixed regression is slightly 
insignificant with p-value of 0.159. This result conflicts with the fourth hypothesis 
but is expected considering indications of negative value premium for hedgers are 
found throughout univariate and multivariate testing, and if hedging leads to lower 
value of Tobin’s Q, a larger hedging position is expected to further increase the 
negative effect since the open risk related to the position is higher. Moreover, as the 
first, second and fourth hypotheses were based on the strongest findings in prior 
literature, the hedging coverage sign is opposite to the expected sign in Table 3. 
Further evidence for rejecting the second hypothesis on account of foreign currency 
hedgers is found from Model 12 as foreign currency hedgers dummy in both pooled 
OLS and fixed effects regression is negative with fixed effects showing highly 
significant and negative premium of -10,98 %. Even greater negative premium of -
14,85 % for foreign currency hedgers found with Model 9 has decreased due to 
adding of hedging coverage while the coefficients for other control variables are still 
in line with Table 9 findings. Since the hedging coverage coefficient is strong and 
negative in the pooled OLS regression of Model 12 and shows additional support 
for rejecting the fourth hypothesis, it is possible that the negative hedging premium 
found for foreign currency hedgers in Models 9 and 12 is related or the result of large 
derivative positions established for hedging foreign currency risk exposure in firms.  
On the contrary, more evidence for accepting the third hypothesis is found with 
Model 13 as the interest rate hedgers have negative and highly significant premium 
of -14,86 % in pooled OLS model and -5,27 % premium in fixed effects estimation 
still significant at 10 % level.  The negative premium for interest rate hedgers has 
been present from the univariate tests to multivariate regression estimates, and in 
theory is expected because of the current negative interest rate market environment.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study is to examine the use of derivatives in Finnish non-
financial firms and to test if a value premium in line with Allayannis & Weston 
(2001) can be found for derivative users. Firms are categorized for univariate tests 
based on the type of derivatives they employ: foreign currency derivatives, interest 
rate derivatives or commodity price derivatives. Furthermore, firms are classified as 
general hedgers if they use any of the above mentioned derivative types, and non-
hedgers if no sign of derivative usage is found from their financial statements. The 
total sample used in univariate and multivariate regressions includes 748 firm year 
observations from Nasdaq OMX Helsinki collected during 2010–2016. In addition, 
effect of the relative size of firm’s nominal derivative position on firm market value 
is tested by adding hedging coverage as a control variable for the final regressions 
for which eleven firms are deleted from the sample due to missing data leaving 737 
observations for the final regressions.  
This thesis contributes to the existing literature by providing results on derivatives 
firm market value effect with recent data including years after the financial crisis, 
which are not included in most of the prior studies. Moreover, the effect of negative 
market interest rates environment can be examined as years 2015 and 2016 are 
included in the sample period. The hypotheses are tested in univariate and 
multivariate regressions using Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm market value, following 
Allayannis & Weston (2001) and Belghitar et al. (2008).  Mean and median 
differences in Tobin’s Q are tested in univariate analysis between derivative user 
sub categories during positive and negative interest rate periods. Selected control 
variables are added in multivariate analysis to capture the factors which are known 
to affect firm market value, including rather untested hedging coverage.  
In contrast to Allayannis & Weston (2001) and many of the previous studies, 
univariate regressions indicate negative value premium for general hedgers. The 
negative effect is stronger during negative interest rate period and seems to be 
driven by interest rate hedgers especially. When tested for firms which use only one 
type of derivative, a highly significant negative premium is still found for interest 
rate hedgers, the negative premium being larger during negative rates period in 
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2015–2016. These results are in support for the third hypothesis and in line with 
Nguyen & Faff (2007) and Khediri & Folus (2010). Commodity price hedgers are not 
included in the individual tests since over 90 % of commodity price hedgers are 
using also foreign currency or interest rate derivatives. Thus, commodity price 
hedgers are not included as their own group in multivariate analysis, where 
regressions are run for general hedgers, foreign currency hedgers and interest rate 
hedgers separately.  
For multivariate analysis where pooled OLS and fixed effects regressions are 
estimated, control variables are added for size, leverage, growth, profitability, 
liquidity, access to financial markets, negative rates and hedging coverage. With 
pooled OLS regression, a highly significant negative premium of -13,77 % is found 
for general hedgers, and even larger negative premium of -14,86 % for interest rate 
hedgers. These results are strongly in contrast to Allayannis & Weston (2001) 
findings and indicate a rejection for the first and second hypothesis.  The negative 
value premium is further confirmed in fixed effects regressions which show 
negative but insignificant effect for general hedgers, highly significant and negative 
premium of -10,98 % for foreign currency hedgers and -5,27 % negative value 
premium still significant at 10 % for interest rate hedgers respectively. These results 
indicate that instead of positive value effect, hedging has been value destroying for 
Finnish firms after the financial crisis. Therefore, we reject both first and second 
hypothesis as positive value premium supporting Allayannis & Weston (2001) 
results is not found in any of the results in this thesis. Support for accepting the third 
hypothesis is found from the univariate analysis as negative value premium for 
interest rate hedgers is found to be larger during negative market rate environment, 
a result further confirmed with multivariate analysis. Finally, the fourth hypothesis 
cannot be accepted as hedging coverage has negative effect to firm market value in 
pooled OLS regressions and negative but insignificant effect in fixed effects 
regressions. Thus, indicating that as hedging with derivatives seems to cause 
negative value effect, a larger derivative position further enhances that negative 
effect. 
Overall the results show no support for Allayannis & Weston (2001) findings but are 
more in line with Nguyen & Faff (2007), Khediri & Folus (2010) and Naito & Laux 
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(2011), which found no effect or found negative effect between use of derivatives 
and firm market value. However, there are aspects that affect firm market value 
which require further analysis, and which are not controlled by the regression 
models used here. First, as the sample descriptive statistics show, non-users in the 
Finnish sample are identified as mostly small firms and therefore the effect of firm 
size on Tobin’s Q is difficult to rule out as most of the large firms are hedgers. Also, 
firms are classified as hedgers and non-hedgers without considering the level of 
hedging and therefore the hedgers group can include also firms which have only 
one derivative contract, for instance. Furthermore, factors like brand value and 
public image which are hard to value but still affect firm market value, are not 
included in the models. Additionally, the global economic growth after the financial 
crisis is definitely a factor in increased firm market value during the sample period, 
even though years 2015 and 2016 are here treated from the negative market rates 
perspective.  
For further research, testing the hedging coverage control variable with larger 
European sample could provide stronger results on the significance of derivative 
position size, and to be able to differ the value effect of derivatives from the other 
variables affecting firm market value, a more advanced regressions models are 
needed. By replicating a comprehensive study like Allayannis & Weston (2001) 
using large U.S or European sample and data after the financial crisis, more reliable 
evidence could be found on the current value effect of hedging with derivatives. 
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